In this treatise it is substantiated that a given structure by means of which the phenomena sprout up does no exist. For that reason, we have to understand the world by means of a top down model, by means of which we steadily interprets the phenomena, as opposed to a bottom up model, which starts from an assumed not-observable basis. The difference between realism and anti-realism is not primarily a question of existence, but of our organising the world, of the direction of the explanation structure. Thus, the difference is a question about a deep understanding of what kind of world we live in.

The section “Three different views of the concept of physical object” clarifies the view that realism, phenomenalism and anti-introductionism respectively have on the concept of physical object, which is touched on in Treatise No 1. The important result is here that the principle of inference to the best explanation cannot be used to conclude to the literal existence of not-observable objects. This is discussed in the subsection “Realism”. In the subsection “Phenomenalism” it is argued that the idea that we conceive an object on the basis of different sense qualities and thought processes is inconsistent. Moreover the concept of recognition is problematic in this connection. For according to anti-introduction we simply sense an object as a whole whose qualities we can clarify.

The section “Top down and bottom up explanations” describes how we can imagine a structure of explanations in which references to our sensations are placed at the top and references the latest introduced theoretic results of science are placed at the bottom. Then, antirealism can be describes as a top down model of knowledge according to which we with starting point in the top can give an account of the theoretic entities. Realism can be described as a bottom up model of knowledge where our goal is to explain our sense impressions on the basis of its bottom.

The section “The prototypical realism” clarifies the linguistically senseless of the idea of other worlds. This can be contrasted with the anti-realist rejection of the concept, which is justified in the section “Anti-introductionistic clarifications”.

In the section “The basis of scientific explanations” it is substantiated that we cannot understand measured results as anything else than the result of a measurement process, i.e. not as representing any underlying reality, as we have nothing to do with such an entity.

The section “Time” expounds that our ideas of the fulfilment of our expectations in some future are only based on our memories. Moreover, our fictions about the past have more premises than our fictions about the future.

In “Cause and effect”, it is argued that our imagination of an effect are only fictions based on our memories, as we have no experiences originating from anything we can call “the future”. To state a cause is only to refer to a demonstrated regularity.

In the section “The concept of psychical energy” it is explained that just as we cannot talk about physical energy in itself, we cannot maintain a concept of physical energy in itself, i.e. without in the last end referring to observable phenomena.

In the section “Solipsism / other minds” it is established that we cannot refer to anything we can call the other person’s sense impressions as such as we cannot experience them but only refer to the other person’s statements about it. This does not prevent us from using a realist language, as we can interpret statements about other persons’ consciousness in a non-empty way. The question is just what we can put into this usage. Using analogous considerations would be to introduce a new entity, though I have a concept of my own thoughts, memories and sense impressions. However, we know that we are facing another person with a view of the world, since his behaviour and his expressions can surprise us.

1. Three different views of the concept of physical object.

This chapter contains a clarification of the view on three conceptions referred to in Treatise No 1, viz. 1) Realism, 2) phenomenalism, 3) anti-introductionism.

1.1 Realism.

According to realism and common sense, an object is typically something that simply exists, i.e. independently of a clarification or interpretation. This line of thought supports the idea of the literal existence of objects of which we cannot know under any circumstances, such as the so-called not-observable entities. In defence of this, it has be advanced that realism with its idea of not-observable objects is a good and effective assumption, which is advantageous and thus can be declared true by means of the principle of inference to the best explanation.[1] Thus, it is asserted that the assumption that electrons exist is a useful idea for science, wherefore they must exist, then.

It is true that concerning observable objects we may conclude in this way: “The box which is placed on the scales weighs more than a similar empty box; therefore it is presumably filled with something”. This conclusion quite unproblematically deals with existence very not existence. However, the philosophic discussion of what we can say about not-observable entities deal with something else. It deals with clarification of the semantic meaning of the concept of not-observable entities. This cannot be obtained by arguing for the existence of not-observable entities, as this presupposes that we have clarified what we discuss. Of course, this is circular.

Below the criticized use of the principle of inference to the best explanation will be looked at on the basis of a more detailed description of it.

The principle of inference to the best explanation can also be expressed in this way:

The principle of inference to the best explanation is built on the idea that a number of facts, F, may be regarded as good reasons of an assumption A, if this assumption (X) is able to make these facts (F) and possibly a number of other observations fit reasonably together. This way of arguing is rather remarkable, as it elevates an assumption into a conclusion.

However, it may be acceptable to put forward such an argument if it meets the following three demands:

1. The mentioned assumption A must be uncompounded, and thus not consist of both an assumption Y and an assumption Z.

2. In addition, the assumption (and the conclusion) A must not involve the introduction of a concept of a type of entity that is not clarified.

3. It must in principle be possible to confirm the assumption A directly.

Explanations that do not satisfy the first demand are simply to easy to make up, while explanations that do not satisfy the second demand are excessive as they presuppose that it is possible to introduce a concept of a new type of entity without a preceding clarification and argumentation.

The above conclusion (from F to A) is usable in the everyday life where the conclusion can be otherwise verified (is verifiable in principle), as mentioned in point 3. Moreover point 2 is not broken, as the assumed entities are known in everyday life.

However, used for semantic clarification of new areas, e.g. not-observable entities such as electrons, this sort of argumentation does not fulfil any of the demands:

Demand one, that the assumption A must be uncompounded, and thus not consist of both an assumption Y and an assumption Z, is violated by the assumption Y about a really existing entity, and the assumption Z, that it is substantiated in what this existence consists, i.e. that it is at all meaningful to assert that the kind of entities in question exists. Moreover, as mentioned, it is exactly this that is discussed.

Demand two, that the assumption and the conclusion A must not involve the introduction of a concept of a new entity that has not already been clarified, is violated because of the kind of the assumed Z, mentioned above. The only thing the scientists know of is measured results and their own scientific ideas. Thus, by this assumption, not only an assumption of the existence of something is introduced, but also the assumption that it has meaning to talk about it, i.e. a definite view of reality. Also therefore, the argumentation is circular

This conclusion is true of all kinds of not-observable objects, such as the concepts of fields in physics and “the unconscious” in psychoanalysis, as the argument does presuppose any special premises which rule out that.

It must be noticed that the principle presupposes a bottom up explanation model, i.e. a model according to which we can still find an already, literally existing, better foundation on the basis of which science can form usable scientific theories. But it is just this foundation which is up for discussion.

Scientists can at most conclude that there is some circumstances present, a set of measured results, which they can use, e.g. in connection to the concept of electron. However in this philosophic connection the case is about the clarification of the semantic meaning of a concept, i.e. whether we are dealing with a really existing entity.

1.2 Phenomenalism.

According to phenomenalism we receive a lot of sense impressions, and when we can ascertain that some of them have a regular behaviour, we regard this set of sense impressions as “one thing”, such as an apple. (Cf. e.g. [Berkeley 88], §1, p. 53.) However, this ascertainment presupposes a certain thought process that leads to this result; but, I do not experience that special thought processes are needed to apprehend something as an object. Moreover, to assert that this process nevertheless takes place “unconsciously” is too easy, as it presupposes that the semantic meaning of the talk about principally hidden processes has been clarified. In this way, a new unclarified concept is introduced in preference to the concept of the object in itself the phenomenalists wish to avoid. In addition, as processes take time, the argument presupposes realism concerning time, and this realism has to be substantiated.

What is more, this phenomenalist view also presupposes knowledge of a basis of reference in the form of an idea of a definite kind of object, if we should be able to conclude “this is an apple”. There are two sorts of situations, 1) the ordinary kind, where we know some already named sorts of things, and 2) a more special situation, in which we recognize a thing, whose kind is new to us, and possibly name it. However, also situation 2 presupposes ideas of definite forms and patterns and superordinate terms, at least the superordinate term “object”.

Let us assume that we make a comparison of what we have sensed with the idea of one or more objects. In the first sort of situation, as well as in the second, it is difficult to explain from where we have these standards of reference, whether it is a matter of ideas of already known objects with which the sensed objects may be compared immediately, or a matter of known characteristics and superordinate terms. How do we receive these ideas - do we also build up them? A confirming answer seems to lead to an infinite regress. A denying answer must imply that we somehow receive the standard of reference as a whole, and then we may just as well say that we sense something we regard as objects immediate and without comparison - that is, in this sense directly.

1.3 Anti-introductionism.

The above idea of our immediate sensation of objects is in agreement with the anti-realistic view, which has been called anti-introductionism. For according to this we simply sense an object as a whole, whose properties we are able to clarify:

Only what is actually clarified exists; and it only possesses meaning to talk about what we know that we are able to clarify. This demand for sense concerns statements about existence and qualities.

As touched on in the subsection “Minimal suppositions” in Treatise No 1, inspired by Michael Dummett, we can achieve a usable formulation by talking about statements in preference to entities:

Only actually verified statements about existence can be declared true and in that case only with reference to their verification procedure; and only those existence statements that we know that we are able to verify, or reject, possess meaning.[2]

Thus, nothing hidden forms part of this worldview, and neither do any unnecessary metaphysical assertions of existence. As mentioned above, when we sense something that is red (“sense a red colour”) this is a direct experience, which takes place without any comparison. I do not experience any comparative consideration in this connection. Besides, with what shall I compare my sense impressions?

I cannot compare my sense impression of the red colour with my memory impressions of a red colour, for the next question would be how I should be able to determine that I am faced with facing a memory impression of a read colour.

2. Top down and bottom up explanations.

According to what has been advanced, the following applies:

As regards both material and linguistic subjects, we have to do with an explanation structure that can still be clarified. We do not need assume anything more fundamental than this.

On the contrary, as it has been set out in connection to the argumentation against the extended application of the principle of inference to the best explanation, in principle it is impossible to argue for the existence of a not-observable basis or matter which causes the structure of our sensations. Of course, this is not a simple question of existence or not-existence, but a question concerning what the world is in metaphysical respect.

We may distinguish between two conflicting ideas of what it means to explain. As regards structure, our explanations may be structurally described as being in accordance with either a top down knowledge model, with our experiences in the top as the primary part, or a bottom up knowledge model with the basis or the substance at the bottom as the primary part.[3] These two knowledge models may be regarded as interpretations of anti-realism and realism respectively:

According to the top down knowledge model the phenomena - plus our memories, thoughts and feelings - are the fundamentally real entities. The phenomena, among which are both sense impressions and their behaviour, form the basis of our whole understanding of reality, as we describe observed connections on a superior level by application of concepts of objects and their qualities and behaviour, such as ”table”, ”green” and ” tilting”. Based upon the regularities of our sense impressions (as the same systematism is retrieved at more sensations) science forms theories that contain helping concepts, such as “atom” and “magnetic field”, and which can be used to describe of the regularities. By this, we extend our knowledge to a still broader and deeper tree structure - of which some branches may be grown together.

According to the bottom up knowledge model our sense impressions (understood as something created in us, conditioned by our sense faculty) is something that we aim to explain. This explanation starts from a foundation, viz. an idea of physical matter, as it is assumed that our sense impressions are both caused and passed on by means of this matter. However, it is contained in the concept of foundation that it has qualities based upon which other qualities can be explained, but it also has to be explained itself (eventually). So this realist foundation is deliberately based upon a foundation that constantly can be exchanged. Whether a last foundation exists, is naturally an essential question to this knowledge model.

What are only usable help concepts in the top down model are elevated to an existing foundation in the bottom up model. To reach this foundation, the proponents of the bottom up model certainly apply the same principles of observation and principles of making theories as the those a of the top down model, but stop when they have got down to a level where they consider their most lately established helping concepts to be a foundation; and after this downwards going tour as regards explanation they make a backwards going tour upwards from this foundation to reach their aim with regard to explanation. Thus, it is first at this stage that their explanations take place bottom up though this approach is their stated basic principle.

An example.

The following two conflicting ideas of what it means that gravitation exists can be put forward:

According to the one of these ideas, gravity is something that has an effect on objects or masses within a certain spatial area, a so-called gravitational field. It is the cause of changes in their movements and it functions in a definite way, which science can find out by means of experience. Thus, gravitation causes an object to fall with an acceleration g.

According to the other view of gravitation, we can only assert that experiences show that objects within a certain field in space fall according to a certain regularity, which we may describe by means of a constant, the gravitational acceleration g. We are not able to ascribe meaning to this constant independently of such experiences. The same applies to the force, i.e. the gravitation m * g, which we can measure in the field. Still, these renunciations do not prevent us from calling this product “the force of gravity”. Likewise, we can call this regularity “a law”.

However, we do not have any reason to assert that things fall to the ground because of the force of gravity, simply. On the contrary, it is because of things falling to the ground that we have defined the concept of force of gravity.

Therefore, when we refer to the force of gravity in answers to questions why an event passed off in a particular way, we only express that the course was in accordance with a recorded regularity which may be described by an expression in which the term ”gravitation” occurs. Thus we do not need to assert the existence of the force of gravity understood as something else than m * g, but only that we have observed a regularity from which we may draw some conclusions, just as we can set up a formula with which our experience agree. It is not necessary to attribute another meaning than this to the force of gravity and the law of gravity. This way of thinking corresponds to the top down explanation model.

By contrast, the realists will assert that this gravitation, of which we have formed an idea in accordance to the above line of thought, in fact exists in itself, and in their explanations they want to take this force of gravity as their starting point and assert that it is a cause. Thus, they want to elevate the helping concept of gravitation to something real, which is exactly in accordance with the bottom up way of thinking.

It results from the above top down model that a law is just a recorded regularity. In other words: To explain something is to class it with law. We explain that a thing fall in a definite way by saying that the fall in question is in accordance with the description of a so far recorded regularity, which we call a law governing the type of phenomena in question.

3. The prototypical realism.

Some may advance that although we cannot attribute semantic meaning to the assertion that a definite not-observable entity or state “X” exists, or attribute semantic meaning to this term “X” at all, this entity may nevertheless exist, irrespectively of the fact that for these grounds we cannot adduce cogent reasons to this putative existence. Here “X” may e.g. denote the literally existence of electrons or the subconscious mind. This imagined counter argument, or rather statement, can of course only be a joke, for according to the premise the question is semantically senseless.

With the same justice we might advance the prototypical realist statement that other worlds exist so to say “beside” or “in excess of” this world, somehow; or less metaphorically: independently of the world in which we live, i.e. without any interaction with it. Possible statements that the other world influences us would be self-contradictory as it then would be a part of our world, i.e. the world with which we interact. In this way, we would just be dealing with one world. Therefore, we cannot empirically prove the existence of such a world without refuting the discussed statement, and all logical reasons concerning empiric states demand empiric premises. As such a putative world does no difference to us statements about it are completely arbitrary.

For the same reasons, of course this also applies to the concept of a thing in itself. It only has sense to talk about what we have to do with.

4. Anti-introductionistic clarifications.

The following can be remarked concerning our knowledge, which is clarified below:

In no respect do we need to assume that the world has been constructed from hidden details, only that we are able to clarify what is immediately given. Neither do we need assume that events are caused by changes of hidden details; instead, we only need to class the phenomenon with an established regularity or systematism of our observations.

This means that it is unnecessary to apply a concept of causation. Instead, we can class a physical phenomenon with a rule or a systematism, a so-called “law of nature”. When we answer a question of why something is true, we are only able to refer to a regularity (called ”a law”), under which the accident comes- plus a set of initial conditions which belong to this (called ”a cause”).

We can also class a linguistic formulation with a rule, but in this case is different. For example, we simply have to realize that our mother tongue, to a certain extent, can be systematized in a way which can be expressed by means of a number of language rules that constitute a grammar, and that this is so even if we do not follow all these rules actively (or perhaps consciously). As mentioned, we may also realize that we are dealing with rules that may still be clarified because they cannot handle a great corpus, even when the rules concern the same time.

This talk about ”a number of language rules” does not imply that there is a finished set of (potentially infinitely many) rules, of which we have to attempt to track down as many as possible. The statement that we cannot get to the bottom of these rules just mean that it is constantly possible to find further linguistic rules (e.g. grammatical), because when we try out those we have found, apparently each time we find a new linguistic phenomenon, which we have not discovered: a detail which we have not yet discovered. Thus we may now and again read or utter a sentence which seems to reveal an unknown grammar rule (often concerning a specific detail or a so-called exception) because we think that the sentence has to be uttered in a specific way, of which we cannot refer to a known rule. However, this is only an empirical example and not meant to be more than that.

We can imagine robots, constructed in such a way that they are able to handle many different sorts of situations; but there will still be details and variants to which they are not adapted, as we have not taken them into account. This is analogous to our understanding and description of our mother tongue. It is not a question of our literally employing a grammar but only of the fact that our usage cannot be described grammatically, though we may still be able to clarify the description of it. Thus, the grammatical rules are objects for our clarification, but it is not possible to prove that they are the result of something finished, some existing unknown rules.

The fact remains that we formulate our thought verbally in a way that functions to some sufficient degree. This is a superior fact which we are able to analyze and describe. Concerning the grammatical form and structure of our formulations, we do not need to assume that we in every detail actively construct them on the basis of a completed theory, in the way that we know a number of rules from which we build the structure and the form of our sentences. Thus we do not need to assert either that we know the rules for those formulations which we have not included in our experimentally worked out and written down grammar. Instead we simply have to realize that we express ourselves in a way that may be described without our having to assert the existence of already defined rules with which we comply.

Against that it may be adduced that our formulations take place actively, but unconsciously, from rules that have been incorporated in the brain and coded there somehow. However, this idea presupposes a realistic idea of the brain and with it a realistic metaphysics altogether, which must be substantiated before the argument can be adduced. For that reason, the objection is only a postulate that uses the idea of a brain as a dustbin for unsolved problems.

In a similar way, natural science can only pronounce on realized regularities in nature and on the regularities or theories to which it may infer mathematically or logically on the basis on the realized ones, for there is nothing more to say about the phenomena; thus it is not necessary to assert that something exists behind the phenomena of which the theories may be said to e true or false of. In addition, even if we adopted a realistic idea of time, it would not possess any meaning to say that scientific theories are descriptions of a provisional set of observations. What is true about them is that they are usable to some extent. We may call the theories the best provisional guesses, but guesses at what - guesses at what truth is? An answer to this question will be attempted in the following.

Instead of adopting the idea of an underlying reality which our theories may be said to be true of, we only need assert that a statement is true if it is possible to sense that the facts are just as the statement expresses, i.e. if it is in accordance with our sensations and these are reliable.

Some may assert that it is in contradiction to anti-realism that our language reflects a realistic view of the world, and that it is difficult to avoid speaking in realist terms about the world. However, I do not think that this is a problem to the anti-realist, as it is usually only important to think in an anti-realist way in connection with philosophical considerations concerning fundamental philosophical problems, e.g. the relation between brain and consciousness, in which cases the anti-realist may express himself in accordance to anti-realism by use of more elaborated phrases, if necessary. This means that as long as the anti-realist is aware of this fact, as an anti-realist he may express himself by means of realist phrases.

The realists have had luck with adducing that objects and their qualities understood as something that exist in themselves are something that are more real than the mere impressions of objects and their qualities. However, they cannot expound what these statements of existence imply; at best, they are only able to put their feet down or invoke the concept of good assumptions. This is discussed in succeeding treatises.

On the other hand, the anti-realists can adduce that as mentioned we do not ourselves control our sense impressions of colour and objects and that these thus are more than just impressions.

5. The basis of scientific explanations.

The idea of the existence of definite lengths presupposes too much. This is said independently of theories of relativity and uncertainty of measuring, just as it does not concern the practical troubles with the problem of measuring the length of a coastline in all details. We simply cannot attribute meaning to the concept of a definite length in itself of an object as we have nothing to do with any such entity at all. For that reason we have to reject the concept of the true result of a measurement, understood as something that corresponds to or describes some underlying reality. We can only attribute meaning to the process of measurements and their results as such, i.e. as the mere values the scientists have arrived at in a specific way. However, understood like that, these measurement results can enter into meaningful statements and theories.

Thus, imaginations of lengths and other measurements in themselves are unnecessary and meaningless additions to our scheme of things. The prevailing misunderstanding may due to this: As long as we, the way it is the case in everyday life, do not need a particularly great accuracy in our measuring and estimation, we do not form a concept of definite measurements of anything. Our measuring and evaluations may be related to our handling of the thing we measure, that is, in a way that works, and for that reason in everyday life, we do not need extra imaginations of measures in themselves. This can be equally true of science, as scientists' measurements and evaluations may be related to their handling of what they measure in a way that works - without any use the idea of measurement in itself. Instead, these ideas of lengths in themselves are caused by still more precise measurements. Statements about measurements’ becoming more precise does not necessarily mean that the results get nearer to something really existing but only that they make our explanations to cohere better.

Moreover, this thought presupposes that also the theories about the regularities that science works out and uses for determining the so-called causes have a definite form, a real true form that exists independently of the search of science. In addition, if they existed, tracking them down would presuppose that it were possible to track down some definite measurements, and that it has meaning to talk about them, as these are necessary for developing the final theories.

6. Time.

We have an idea that we can do something now and then wait and see the consequences later. We regard this as a matter of course as we think that we have experienced this so often. However, the very reason to our taking it for granted cannot be empirical, as we neither possess any basis of saying that we have experienced the time nor that we experience the time now. Instead, we possess memories we regard as arranged in a special way we call time - although our memories may also be arranged in another way. It is simply just a fact that we (most of us) take time as granted, viz. understood as a sequence of nows, even though we are not able to explain the true facts of the case. Therefore, these ideas cannot concern any future, but just only be ideas.

When we act for the sake of the future, it is because of the imagination of a future that will arrive some day. However, this cannot prove that a future will really arrive some day as a continuation of our temporal arranged memories. The fact that this may seem paradoxical only shows that we do not understand our existential situation fundamentally, i.e. metaphysically.

It is a fact that we have never verified the assumption that a future will arrive, for we do not possess experiences of such a confirmation, as this is logically impossible, in the nature of the case. For we only experience the now and the included memories, but our memories are only impressions, not memories of an actually existing past, and thus not memories of having experienced a future in any way either. For that reason we cannot have experienced that the future comes and we cannot remember experiencing it. We can only have memory impressions, some of which we place as nows that are later in the direction of the temporal arrangement of experiences than other nows.

However, expressing oneself in terms of “recollected experiences” is realist talk. We get a more clarified exposition by talking about our having different kinds of memories which can be classified as “experience memories”, “thought memories”, etc., just like the now. In this respect, there are two possibilities, which will be described here, partly in realist terms:

1) We have memories of experiences that we may relate to memories of other experiences that are earlier in the temporal order.

2) We may here and now experience something that we may relate to memories of other experiences.

However, we have never experienced nor made good the validity of the imagined transferring of the structure of our memories to a future, the way this structure is described in 1) and 2).

The now is not a cut through a time axis in a realist sense, as we do not have any basis of asserting this, but a situation of relating, a presence if we are aware of it.

We can act for the sake of the now; but if we merely act for the sake of the future we act to destroy the value of the now or at least to scorn the now, the way it has been described in Treatise No 1.

Above it has been made clear that a fiction about the future we cannot seriously regard as a fiction about a future that will come. For we have never experienced any future and cannot even attribute meaning to the concept of a coming time as anything different from an idea. For that reason, it is more correct – rather than talking about a future - just to talk about fictions about the future, or simply future-fictions. The structure of a future-fiction is an imitation of our structuring of our memories and our now:

Instead of saying that the future is a future-fiction it is more precise to say that the future does not be at all, that in fact there is nothing we can call “the future”, that the idea of it is false. It is that what we are relating to is only a special sort of fiction.

6.1 Differences between past and future.

We have construed the structure that we call “past” on the basis of our theories and certain objects that are present to us in the now - including so-called “relics of the past”, our own memories and “evidences of the past”, as these give occasion for a fiction about entities, states and events belonging to this past-structure in some modified form (about e.g. the house in which we live). We possess evidences which we date to different periods in this structure on the basis of our theories (e.g. theories about different forms of crumbling). These theories may thus give us ideas of younger versions of what we see now. Thus, based on the remains of a building, we can place our ideas of a new-built version of the building at a point on the time axis.

Something quite similar may seem to apply to the future. However, we do not possess any evidence whose existence with certainty may be extended to the future understood as a future-fiction in any way. The reason is that we are able to form fictions in which the extensions of these evidences either do not exist, exist at a distant place, or are spoiled already at a approaching, succeeding moment in the fiction. Concerning the past, however, it is not reasonable to form a fiction that the house in which I live suddenly has come into existence two days ago. That is, here we are dealing with time understood as relations between events of the fictions, not about time in a realist sense.

As a by-product of the hic-et-nunc-anti-realism, the following must conclusion can be drawn.

The sceptical problem according to which we cannot know whether the world has come into existence in a complete version seven minutes ago cannot exist in this hic-et-nunc philosophy of time because the past is an ordered fiction based on our here and now situation, as it has been described above. With this, this problem becomes void.

At all points on the time axis, the same kinds of things have the same ontological status.

The world exists hic-et-nunc. There is nothing before and after in a literal sense, but only on the time axis; these concepts of before and after have only meaning used about this.

Both our fictions about the past and fictions about the future are bound by what necessarily follows from our knowledge about present states and the regularity of nature. Moreover, however, fictions about the past are bound by so-called evidences and finds, which we relate to different points in the past, and which in this way form fix points to the fantasy. Contrary to that, there is not anything similar we can relate to the future. For that reason, there is no symmetry between past and future in spite of certain similarities.

When it is here put forward that these evidences or what I know or sense now may be absent from the fiction from a certain point relative to its temporal order, this is not about something which may happen ”in the future” but about one or more possible future-fictions. We cannot asset that one particular fiction is the only fiction which I may form, for instance a fiction in which I own a particular bicycle, as I do not control whether my bicycle is stolen now: my knowledge about the world does not allow me to limit my fiction in such a way that my bicycle cannot be stolen in any of them. As the fiction may deal with several imaginary future situations, something unexpected or accidental may happen in each one of these.

7. Cause and effect.

It follows from the above that the predicates “cause” and “effect” only applies to own memories, other persons’ statements about their memories or detailed notes, that is, to what we can predicate as past. Our idea of a future effect of an act or a process only makes up a fiction.

The only thing we can put into the concept of cause is a reference to a demonstrated regularity: When we ask about the cause of an accident we are just asking which demonstrated regularity the event in question can be classed with and which actual elements is included. Science has written down several of these regularities as theories or so-called laws with which we may characterize events as being in agreement, but as mentioned, it is not necessary to interpret laws as anything else than experienced regularities, which can make part of our future fictions.

There may be several causes for a particular effect as the same effect may arrive in several different ways. The more detailed a state is described the more its set of possible causes certainly grows narrower. But talking about a condition's having to be in a particular way and for that reason having a certain delimited set of possible causes is to presuppose too much. For all these assumed details cannot be listed. Thus both our past-fictions and future-fictions are uncertain.

We know the concept of cause, or rather experience of the form “After the event A, the event B follows”, from our memories and from records. At least, here and now we possess structures of expectations, which we may substantiate by referring to our memories, theories etc. However, we have no experiences from the future. This seems to be yet an argument for past and future’s being of a different nature because our fictions about the future are directly based on our memories and indirectly on our theories, as the last-mentioned are based on our memories and the now, and we attribute our memories to the past.

Concerning the relation between cause and effect as we experience it every day, our ideas about this may be attributed to a number of uniform memory impressions (what we ordinarily call "memories”). (Cf. [Hume 90], §§ 24-25) However, it must be questioned whether it really is for that reason that we have this idea of cause and effect? Thus, I possess no memory of having deduced that things fall towards the earth, understood as regularity. Perhaps we simply have this perception of heaviness, which we may even clarify, for instance by relating it to the fact that we feel our own heaviness here and now.

The case seems to be different as to memories of training and learning of skills, in which we experience and use the fact that the same actions are repeated with the same effect. However, we can also look at the training as a case off cause and the learned skill as an effect. Here, in a corresponding way, we know that training has such an effect, without having trained before.

Again, talking about this understanding as something learned and subsequently ”encoded in the brain”, presupposes a realist conception of the past as well as of the physical world. That such a talk is based on a postulate, as we do not know this "encoding”, is in this connection only a secondary mistake.

8. The concept of psychical energy.

It follows from the example above that talking about forces and energies as something that exists in itself (i.e. without our being able to refer to observations of any regular phenomena) reflects a too literal understanding of these physical concepts. If we can demonstrate a certain regularity in the behaviour of things, we may describe this and give it a name, e.g. the name “force of gravity” or “electromagnetic field”. However, to such entities we cannot generally attribute another existence than just this “certain regularity” - not even if we think that they resemble other known phenomena.

This also applies to our talk about psychic energy, analogously to the physical energies in science. Physical objects can possess potential energy, be added kinetic energy by a push, and get a lower kinetic energy because of friction. However, a concept of energy in itself, i.e. energy that cannot be related to definite events or conditions does not possess any meaning. In the same way, a concept of psychical energy in itself, i.e. psychical energy that cannot be related to definite events or conditions does not possess any meaning.

Thus, when somebody says, ”I have used a lot of energy on writing these letters”, this does not mean, that something like the speaker's energy exists as something different from the fact that she cannot concentrate on her thinking of writing letters and thereafter, without being influenced, do other things. For that reason we can only talk about psychic energy as an expression which denotes something like this fact: that we are only able to perform a limited amount of work during a certain period - for instance that we get so tired by doing a certain job that we cannot so easily do the next job. Certain experiences (e.g. to rest, to receive a letter, to get a good idea, to write other sorts of letters) may conversely cause that we can do further jobs. In such cases, we can talk about our getting more energy. Because a number of different jobs (or events) may cause that we are only able to de fewer jobs, and as other likewise entirely different events can cause that we are able to do more jobs, the concept of energy is a convenient concept. However, it is important to note that it is neither necessary nor meaningful to talk about psychical energy in itself, i.e. energy (or changes of energy) that cannot be related to the carrying out a job, or to another experience.

9. Solipsism / other minds.

9.1 Different views of the problem.

The problem of solipsism concerns the realist as well as the anti-realist, but not in the same way:

For the realist, the problem is purely sceptic as it is a matter of how to substantiate that he (or the individual person) is not the only existing conscious being, i.e. that there are other consciousnesses.

For the anti-realist the problem is not only how he (the anti-realist) can justify that there are other conscious beings than him, but first and foremost what the statement means, i.e. how we can attribute substantial meaning to our talk about other persons' sensations at all.

The realist thinks he can assert the existence of other persons’ consciousness and talk about the content of their consciousness without problems. However, this is only because he does not problematize the meaning of this concept just as much as the anti-realist. Thus, he may think that he can infer the literal existence of other persons’ consciousness by means of conclusions by analogy – or conclude that the other person must necessary have a consciousness just as himself.

To the anti-introductionism this question deals with finding a clarified basis for further clarification of the problem, free from wishful thinking. However, if this should really result into solipsism, there would self-evidently have been nothing to do about that, except finding possible argumentation errors, of course.

9.2 Aspects of the solipsism problem.

When in our everyday life meet another person we usually assume that this person is like ourselves without problematizing this assumption at all. Perhaps we attribute this certainty to our memories about having previously established this. Perhaps we will give the reason that we simply have an impression of facing a person with consciousness. However, this impression does not make up an insight but is just a psychological feeling or an idea. For we do not experience anything we can call another person’s consciousness, such as other persons sensing thinking or remembering, in the same way as we experience our own. The author of this article has at least not experienced anything like that. Besides, it would be very disturbing to the being together with other people to ponder over an imagination about what and how they think and feel. In practise, we just relate to their utterances and their behaviour.

It is simply an empiric fact that we have nothing to ref to concerning the other person’s sense impressions, memories, thoughts, etc., that is, understood as such. For we can neither share them with him nor experience them in any literal sense. We can only refer to and discuss what the other person expresses about these sense impressions, etc., just as we both must understand the other person on the basis of what he expresses.

It must be remarked that this is worded as if the realistic common sense view of this has sense and is true. This be due to the fact that language seem to presuppose that it is so, which again may be due to our being inspired by our own ideas. The fact is that we have a usage that works without having to be literally interpreted.

We can semantically meaningfully assert that there is a table in the room next door as we can examine whether this is true. However, we cannot examine statements about other persons’ sense impressions as such. Not only am I unable to refer to another person’s sensations, as if I sense the same as he does, share his sensations, or just sense that he senses something, but neither is it possible to me or any other person to attribute literal meaning to any concept of this. As long as we do not have a semantic clarification of statements about other persons’ consciousness, we cannot ask question about it, or discuss it

It can be objected “Will you really assert that other persons neither sense nor, remember nor think?” To this it can be answered that as just described, the question is about whether we can attribute semantic meaning to statements about this, which is impossible as this deals with the introduction of a new concept. By this is not meant that the concept is chronologically new, but that it is new in the philosophic argumentation, in the sense that it has an unclarified semantic meaning, a meaning that is not given. The argumentation for this is analogous with the critique of the principle of inference to the best explanation such as it has been advanced in the subsection “realism” above.

It remains only to assert, in a realist language, that I (we) must compare other persons’ statements about their sensation of what they talk about with statements about my (our) possible sensation. This is not reductionism, but only an identification of what is left to us to relate to when we cannot attribute literal or ant semantically meaning to the concept of their sensation analogously understood.

As to the use of conclusions by analogy, these express a poor attitude to the very matter, viz. the other person. The reason is that revealing this use of conclusions by analogy to another person is to tell him, “On thinking it over, I have reached the conclusion that you possess a sort of consciousness beneath your surface or your way of appearance”.[4] Moreover, this conclusion by analogy is in principle incomplete, as its semantic meaning is unclarified, as it appears from the deliberations above.

Certainly it is tempting to assume that the concept of the consciousness of the other person is identical to the concept of one's own consciousness, just as the house one lives in can be compared to the house on the other side of the mountain. However, my sense impressions are impressions that I am confronted with. This means that the assumption that the other person in a similar way has sense impressions he is confronted with, can only consist in some ideas about the other person, ideas which only take point of departure in one’s own experiences of sense impressions memories, etc. and thus cannot go beyond themselves. Thus, this cannot make up a semantically clarified concept of the other person consciousness.

9.4 My experience and that of the other person.

The following examples may serve as a point of departure of an exposition of the above thoughts and conclude in a clarification of what we may put into our usage concerning statements about other persons’ thoughts at most.

Example 1. The person A asks me whether I think that it would be a good idea that, concerning a certain affair, he consults a lawyer Holm whom he had heard well spoken of. However, I remember that A has taken vigorous exception to pronouncements made by lawyer Schmidt at TV. In addition, I know that the lawyer in question is the identical lawyer E. Holm Schmidt. For that reason, I want to tell A that his project is not advisable as in fact A is angry at this lawyer, because it is to his statements at TV that A takes exception.

A's thought about Schmidt (or its contents, if you like) is naturally only “I take vigorous exception to Schmidt because of his remarks” and not “I take vigorous exception to Holm”. Seen in a better light (in casu mine), nevertheless it is clearly true that A is angry with this person Holm, he just does not know that Holm's name is also Schmidt (that Holm and Smith is one and the same person). One thing is a person's thought about another person, in casu A's thought, another thing is the relations about which better informed persons know that the referred persons (and other entities) enters into, in casu that the person whom A is angry with and who A knows only under the name of Schmidt, is identical to the lawyer Holm A has been recommended. (The sentence “We know X” means “I know X, and other persons may tell about X”.)

This does not express relativism, if we by this understand the view that a statement posses truth values that are relative to persons, such that a statement may be said to be true “to the person X” without being true “to the person Y” under the same conditions or circumstances (whatever the phrase “to the person ...” may mean). Thus it is not an expression of relativism to assert “X sees an object in one angle” and “Y sees it in another angle”. However, what can we put into such statements, after all? If neither X nor Y in the example is me, they mean that I may expect different statements from X and Y concerning what they individually see. If Y is I, they mean that I may expect that X will put forward descriptions that do not correspond to my description of what I see. The sense impressions about which X talks do not exist as such to me, because I do not have them, I am only able to ask questions about them and to listen to X's answers. Thus, to me it does not possess any literal meaning to say that X has these sensations, at least not in the same literal meaning that it has to say that I have mine:

The statement “X has these sensations” means to me the aggregate result of my description of X's clarifying talk about them and of my sense impressions of X’s behaviour.

To me, the description of these sensations cannot refer to literally existing sensations, but only to circumstances that permanently can be clarified. Thus, in the situation we simply have a conversation that works, as I may take a position on X's statements in different ways - so here we are really dealing with a language game[5]. I can try to see the object from X’s physical position, and I may relate to the consequences of the statement based on my model of the world. For instance: The diver X announces, “The ship has a small crack at the screw”, or the plumber X says, “The cold-water pipe in the shaft is dripping.” Even though I do not look at the object that X talks about, I may relate to the consequences of what he says, of course. In that case, X's statements are just about asserted facts, to which I may relate in another way, such as it is the case with both examples.

After this, we can look at another version of the example above, where A's and my roles has been interchanged.

Example 2. I ask the person A whether he thinks that it is a good idea that, concerning a certain affair, I consult a lawyer Holm whom I have heard well spoken of. At TV, I have also heard statements uttered by a lawyer called Schmidt and have taken vigorous exception to these. Then A answers me that my idea is probably not to be recommended because in fact I am angry at this lawyer as it was him who provoked me with his statements at TV.

At the moment when I ask the question, it is not a part of my knowledge of the world that the person who I have heard at TV is lawyer Holm. On the other hand, to me it possess meaning to ask A what makes him (A) say what he says, without my attributing him a definite content of consciousness. To me, it is a sufficient answer to hear A's statements about the experiences A has had and which are interesting in this connection.

In example 1, A is the unknowing, and in example 2 I am the unknowing. However, my understanding of A’s situation in example 1 and of my situation in example 2 are not symmetric. In example 1, in which I am better informed than A, I can only realize that A reacts with surprise because of what I tell him. In example 2, I become more informed and at the same time surprised because of what I am told.

However, both situations in question may be described in detail, just in different ways. The realist may assert that the situations are symmetrical, but that is just because he (as previously explained) asserts more about the world than what can be attributed meaning to. The anti-realist, however, can restrict himself to substantiated statements about the world and other persons, which, as we have just seen, is possible without reducing other persons to empty pictures.

9.3 Further clarification of the problem of solipsism.

From the above it has appeared that an analogous idea of consciousness cannot be sustained. Instead we can at most say that there is symmetry in this simple way: On the one hand, the other person can express his thoughts and impressions to me verbally, and on the other hand, I can express my thoughts and impressions to him verbally. In this way we are in the same situation. Thus we both must understand the other person on the basis of what is expressed.

In fact, I am only able to understand another person, whom I face, on the basis of what he expresses about the world and how he relates to the world, by virtue of his communication and his behaviour. Thus, the person in question can express something about the world to which I can make up my mind, but which I would not think myself, just as his behaviour can be surprising. I do not control anything of this.

Another person is altogether an existence that can express something surprising about the world to me. He can express something I would not have felt, observed or thought myself, something which he sometimes may be at pains to express (because the expressed is completely new to me).

It must be remarked that not only can other persons’ statements about their viewpoints and attitudes be surprising in a positive way, but also in many different negative ways.

It is obvious to think that the fact that I have an impression of existence of consciousness already at the first meeting with some person, before it has expressed itself, is due to my memories of such experiences. Thus, also here, impressions of whole are obviously present – which can be clarifies and justified.

Literature.

[Aho 86] Alfred V. Aho & al.: Compilers, Principles, Techniques and Tools.
(Addison-Wesley, 1986)

[Berkeley 88] George Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge
Penguin Books (London 1988)

[Collin 93] Finn Collin: Videnskabsfilosofi.
Folkeuniversitetet (København 1993).

[Dummett 78] Michael Dummett: Truth and other Enigmas
Duckworth (London 1978)

[Hume 90] David Hume: Enquiries
Clarendon Press (Oxford 1990)

[Peterson 96] Michal Peterson et al., ed.: Philosophy of Religion.
Oxford University Press (Oxford 1978).

[Putnam 75 B] Hilary Putnam: Philosophical Papers vol. I; Mathematics, matter and method
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge 1975)

[Wittgenstein 84] Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophische Untersuchungen.
Werkausgabe band 1. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1984.

[1] Cf. ([Putnam 75] p. 73) .This argument is also thoroughly discussed in Treatise No 4.

Moreover it must be mentioned that the author of this treatise obtained knowledge of this concept from Finn Collins Danish book about philosophy of science ([Collin 93] p. 38-9) in which it is compared to circumstantial evidence.

[2] With due reference to ([Dummett 78], p. 358/9).

[3] The terms top down and bottom up originate from linguistics and computer science and among other places they are described in Alfred V. Aho’s Compilers, Principles, Techniques and Tools:

“These terms refer to the order in which nodes in the parse tree are constructed. In the former, construction starts at the root and proceeds towards the leaves, while, in the latter, construction starts at the leaves and proceeds towards the root.” [Aho 86, p. 41])

Usually tree structures are drawn with the root up and the leaves down. Besides it must be remarked, that structures of descriptions often are much more complicated then tree structures. However the concepts top down and bottom up are still usable.

[4] It must be remarked that Alvin Plantinga puts forward a similar statement in his article “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology” in an argumentation for the existence of immediately evident truths ([Peterson 96], p. 313). To this it must be advanced that of course there is immediately evident truths, but they can also be justified subsequently.

[5] This refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s introduction of this term in Philosophische Untersuchungen ([Wittgenstein 84], §23-4).

Philosophical debate

Saturday, December 15, 2012

Anti-introductionism. Treatise No 2.

An exposition of our cognitive situation.

Treatise No 2.

Contents.

Abstract.