Author Ove Møbjerg Kristensen.
To prove “he reality of
things” Immanuel Kant commits the philosophical error of applying a natural
scientifically influenced explanation like “there has once been water on the
Moon for these and these reasons”. However, philosophical conclusions do not
have such a palpability. They deal with what is the semantic meaning of our
existence statements, i.e. what we at most can assert despite of the
established common sense. Thus, philosophy
must e.g. decide questions about what the concept of “a thing in itself” can
refer to at all and in what way.[1] Contrary to this, scientific statements just must be
useful
An illuminating example of an
argumentation that reminds of how Kant talks about there being something
continuous as a basis of our view of time, is: “The one end of the seesaw must
have a higher specific gravity than the other one, for otherwise it could not
balance in the position it has (e.g. with the short end lowest).”
Here we are only dealing with
a conclusion from something known to the existing of some known other thing.
Contrary to this Kant seeks to conclude to the semantical meaningfulness of a
so far not clarified concept: the concept of things that exist in themselves
without being observable. We are here dealing with an extended use of the
so-called conclusion to the best
explanation[2]. All in all, a conglomerate of objections raises against Kant’s short
article. For the sake of clearness, the exposition will be concentrated of some
few of these.
Kant’s arguments are these:
“The
determination of time presupposes something continuous in the observation. This
cannot exist in me, as my existence in time only can be determined by this
continues existence. This must therefore be outside me and not just an idea
of something outside me. There must therefore be real thing that I sense
outside me.” (My translation and summary. [Kant 76] B274 ff.)
This allegation and premise
that the determination of time presupposes “something continuous in the
observation” demands a justification. Kant does not present it in his proof.
Kant’s argumentation aims at proving that there are things outside me”.
Idealists, or at least anti-realists, however do not discuss which semantic
meaning statements about it have. Thus, we must answer the question about what
it means to say that there are things outside me, and when I am justified in
asserting it. I.e., we must look at the assertion conditions of existence
statements.
Thus, to criticize Kant’s
argumentation, it must be made good that it cannot have any sense to talk about
entities outside me, or entities in themselves. I.e., it must be argued that we
do not need more than this regularity. However, it is rather the realists that
must explain what kind of X, they are talking about, and which kind of
difference it makes up.
Contrary to this, Kant’s
augmentation presupposes that it has been clarified what it means that the
things exist as something different from the unavoidable regularity of our
sense impressions. – There are two possibilities:
1) If the expression
“something continuous in the observation” is to be literally understood. i.e.
as being about the single sensations, and not as being about something that
also must be imagined to exist between
the sensations, the case is simple. In these treatises, it has already been
expressed that our external world consists in the unavoidable regularity of the
sense impressions. This view can be justified with the fact that we are not
master of this regularity: For if we look in a definite direction, we see something
definite independently of our will. Already George Berkeley has referred to
this regularity.[3] Certainly, if we change our surrounding, we do see something else, but
that is also definite, dependent on what we d0. This insight does not involve
any idea of existence of entities in themselves at all. Therefore, we only not
need to say that this regularity exists, not that there is also an underlying
existence. The idea that these regular sense impressions must originate in form
somewhere or from anything at all presupposes the discussed realism. As it
consists in asserting something that has no semantic meaning.[4]
As already mentioned the only
thing we in fact relate to, as concerning our talk about things, is our sense
impressions.[5]
In these treatises, it has
also been argued that inference to best explanation, which we are hew dealing
with, only can be used about facts concerning already known types of entities.
However, that kind of
existences, whose art and nature we can neither describe or point out, we
cannot conclude the existence of in any way.
It is far more decisive, though, that
the realism debate can be regarded as dealing with what we need to assert to
draw our conclusions, and not about existence. Certainly, our imaginations can
be usable, but though in this context they may be harmless, perhaps in more
subtle contexts, they may be misleading.[6]
If we cannot point out what
difference the concluded existence shall make out, it is only something we
imagine us – contrary to what Kant asserts.
Thus, we cannot point out any
causing thing; we can only assert that our sensations are due to these
“underlying” entities, whose qualities we cannot explain. However, the only
thing we relate to, are in fact our sense impressions and their regularity. QED
When we deal with things in our daily day, we have no need for thinking at
them as existences that involve things in themselves. When we handle the things
we only need to think of our very experiences with them.
2) If the expression “something continuous in the observation” is instead
to be understood as denoting something that exists between our sporadic
experiences of what we see, this view does not give reasons for any
argumentation in favour of Kant’s realism. For when it is not possible to argue
for the sensible in asserting the literal existence of entities in themselves
as a cause of the individual sense impressions, it is not possible either to
argue for any continuous existence. For the same arguments that was
given against the idea of these existences can be given against the idea of
their continuous existence. QED
Nevertheless, we can look at the following argumentation: It is possible to
imagine that an out-of-the-way room is located a big cylindrical container that
is filled with water in a regular stream, e.g. one litre per minute. In another
room the water level can be read. At some moment, the readings can be compared
with the water level in the room. It can then be asserted that when the
magnitude of the read value must be due to that something real happens to the
filling. However, the case is then just that we have started a known process, that
thus has just as known results. We are only dealing with a useful theory; Thus
is just one of the regularity f nature.
Our very imaginations can be regarded as however natural and evident, but
they are just imaginations.
This connection between the existence
of things and their assertability conditions must also be observed: The
description of the existence of a given entity resembles the description of the
fulfilment of these conditions.[7] In other words, we cannot put more into a statement about the existence of
an object than what is contained in the assertability conditions of the
statement about its existence. The same applies to its qualities.
Concerning our talk about
theoretical entities and their specified qualities, these just belong to a
theory that is based on observation of the phenomena and can be used for
prediction of the phenomena. So these are also comprised by the prediction of
the above remark. They can therefore not form a basis of allegations about
entities in themselves.
We can feel firmness under our
feet, and in this firmness we can say is due to the ground under us. However,
we can also say that this firmness makes up the ground under us. In a similar
way we feel the firmness of our feet, a firmness that defines our feet.
At consumption of food, we
also feel a firmness of the food, we take up with hands and a spoon, and we
feel the firmness of the food against the throat, which we at the same time can
feel by the throat touching the food.
The rest of our ideas of the
imagined chain of events are based on the regularity of our sense impressions
Neither can what we understand
as time be regarded as a real entity. For we do not experience the lapse of
time in the same way as we e.g. have sense impressions. We experience or senses
only the now.[8] As to what we call “past time”, we only have the mere memory impressions
(in the now) of experiences that com before other experiences in the
memory, or before present ones.
Our very determination of what
we call “the passage of time” takes place in the now by means of an already
established system. This does not demand a literary continuous existence, as
Kant presupposes.
It can be put forward /
objected that the time from the moment t1 to t2, e.g.
now, must pass on by virtue on something material, realistically understood.
A justification may be that
there must ne something continuous, if a state has to change in order that the
time can go. This view, though, cannot justify the literal reality of time, as
this presupposes a view about different moments, or rather situations. However,
that kind of existences, whose kind of nature, we self-evidently cannot
describe, we cannot infer in any way.
Our common sense view is that
time is just as something that move along a time axis, a gradually changing if
states, However, this view and idea of a changing, though, presupposes itself a
valid concept of time. Instead, we can satisfy ourselves with attaching a set
of changes to an abstract x-axis.
Additional remarks.
It has been concluded that we do
not need a concept of objects in themselves, as we only need the sense
impressions and their unavoidable regularity. However, what if a tree has fallen
in front of me on the bicycle path. Does the talk about that not presuppose
realism? Here I am not addressing this very use of the concept of thing, but
the thought of and imagination of the heaviness of the tree, and the fact that it
bars my way. This talk of things can certainly suggest that they exist in
themselves. However, I have elsewhere argued that we are not ontologically
committed by our usage.[9] This causes some certain sense impressions if we try to go farther at the
bicycle path, and it demands certain efforts, i.e. bodily sense impressions.
Thus, further assumptions are not necessary.
[Berkeley 88] George Berkeley: Principles
of Human Knowledge
Penguin Books (London 1988)
Penguin Books (London 1988)
[Dummett 78] Michael
Dummett: Truth and other Enigmas
Duckworth (London 1978)
Duckworth (London 1978)
[Fraassen 80] Bas
C. van Fraassen: The Scientific Image
Oxford University Press (Oxford 1980)
Oxford University Press (Oxford 1980)
[Kant 76] Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena
Philosophisce Bibliothek Band 40,
Verlag von Felix Meiner (Hamburg, 1976)
Philosophisce Bibliothek Band 40,
Verlag von Felix Meiner (Hamburg, 1976)
[Kuhn 70] Thomas
S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Second Edition, Enlarged
The University of Chicago Press
(Chicago 1970).
The University of Chicago Press
(Chicago 1970).
[1]Cf. the following from the
subsection “Clarification of the concept of existence” in Treatise
No.3:
Science
and semantic philosophy is two different things: Scientists can advance the
statements about existence they want, and have those imaginations they want, if
only they can be used to describe and predict the observations. Philosophers,
however, have to justify their statements logically or semantically, as this
belongs to the essence of philosophy.
[2] “The principle of inference to the best explanation is built on the
idea that a number of facts, F, may be regarded as good reasons of an
assumption A, if this assumption (X) is able to make these facts (F) and
possibly a number of other observations fit reasonably together. This way of
arguing is rather remarkable, as it elevates
an assumption into a conclusion.
However,
it may be acceptable to put forward such an argument if it meets the following
three demands, for otherwise it is too easy and excessive:…” Cf. the section
“Realism” in Treatise No 2.
[3] This has been mentioned first time
in the subsection, “Inspiration from George Berkeley“ in Treatise No. 1 where Berkeley is quoted for the following:
“When
in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether
I shall see or not, or to determine what particular objects shall
present themselves to my view;” ([Berkeley 88], §29, p. 63, my underlinings.)
Thus,
we do not, quite freely, create our own world. (Insane persons may, in some
sense, create their own world, but they have to fight against their
sensations.)
[4] Cf. the subsection “A fundamental
critique of the approach” in the subsection “The problem of the external world” in
Treatise No 5, in which inter alia ia
put forward:
‘[If the
statement “There is an external world”] is to be understood by analogy with the
statement “There is water on the moon”, this understanding must involve an
answer to these questions: What does it mean that there is an external world?
What shall we search for to find an external world? When have we found an
external world? What shall we do to find an external world?’
“(…) allegations
concerning existence in itself, whatever that is, an existence behind the
phenomena or a causing existence, do not become relevant when we talk about
what we relate to. For in this way it makes no difference to science whether
the existence of these putative entities are only fictions or whether they really
exist.
[6] Cf. the subsection “Theoretic
not-observable entities” in Treatise No 4.
“That a thing exists means
that a number of definite are present. A statement about that can be made based
on a number of fulfilled conditions, the assertability conditions of the
statement. These consist of certain visual impressions, impressions of touch,
etc., and other persons’ statements about what they have seen, e.g. a vase on a
table.”
[9] Cf. The section” Usage and
existence” in Treatise Np 3.
