This article is preliminary.
Anti-introductionism
or
the explanation structure.
An exposition of our cognitive situation.
An introduction and overview.[1]
Contents.
1. General
goals.
This preface to the Treatises No
1-8 aims at explaining how these has got their form
The purposes of the treatises are
1) to find a semantically based explanation of basal philosophical
questions.
2) to find a suitable attitude and approach to philosophical
investigations, and
3) to develop this basis and not least to use this basis.
Point 2 involves a clarification of
2.1) what we can at most assert about a given subject,
2.2) in which sense we can assert it, and
2.3) with which justification.
2. The
treatises.
Here follow some remarks about the background, contents and form of the
treatises.
2.1 Background.
My present philosophy, which is described in the 8 Treatises No 1-8,
started long before these with understanding that the imagination of the world
as “a box or space with something in it” was completely unacceptable. Just as
unacceptable is the idea that man in a literal sense has been “developed during
the curse of time”, starting with different elementary particles that put
together into atoms that later were put together into molecules, which again
constituted other physical structures, as they developed into cells, amoebas,
multicellular organisms, which finally got visual sense, hearing and thereafter
consciousness, as they became sufficiently complicated. For it is here
important that even if we assume this or something similar, i.e. on the
conditions of the line of though, it explains nothing that is seriously
philosophical fundamental. It does not answer the question what it is that
makes that there is matter at all, and what matter is, as a condition of this
diffusely imagined development. Some may certainly say that matter was created
by The Big Bang. However, the
question is more fundamental than this, as it deals with how there can be such a form of existence, i.e. how
there can be matter such as we conceive it. This question must be answered in
this philosophical respect before the answer of the first question can be
satisfactory. In this philosophical context, this scientific answer is
circular.
My thoughts about this led to a number of notes of different kinds,
which I later tried to rewrite. As this did not succeed immediately, instead I
started finding out what the core of the matter was, pushing the already
written text into the background. This resulted immediately in the two first Treatises Part I and Part II.
Among the concepts that remained central are the concept of about the
explanation structure, the top down versus the bottom up explanation model and
the criticism of the extended use of conclusion
to the best explanation, which are taken up again for the first time in respectively
treatise Part II and Part III.
In Part, I tried to explain both what must be the overall ideas and
methods of philosophy and to practice these on some fundamental subjects with
the main stress on the concepts of the physical world and time. In Part II some
aspects of this was clarified, and inter alia a section about solipsism and
other person’s consciousness were added.
After that followed investigations of a number of different questions,
as they emerged. That is why my debt to Michael Dummett’s philosophy is not
discussed until Part IV. In which
also Bas van Fraassen’s philosophy of science is discussed.
The sections in which the single treatises are made up may appear
incoherent, at the same time as the same subject is being elaborated or seen
from new angles in subsequent treatises. However, there been no reason to
change this. First, more important works are waiting, such as a clarification
of Zeno’s paradoxes. Second, I allow myself to believe that the reading of the text
is more varied such as it is.
It must likewise be observed that some of the sections have a metaphilosophical
character, i.e. have philosophy as object, in the sense that they concern general
philosophical subjects. This also applies to the subsections “Proceed to the
very matter” and “The ordinary language” in Part
I, the sections “Usage end existence” in Part III, “The semantic approach to the realism debate” in
Part IV, “The philosophical basis of our thought” in Part V and “The concept of semantic meaning” in Part VI.
However, a certain progress has also appeared. Not least, focus on
questions concerning the object of thing has formed a basis of working with the
so-called mind body problem, just as other considerations has supported the
solution of the question of a basis of ethics.
2.2 Philosophical
start up.
Berkeley’s
phenomenalism.
As Georges Berkeley’s phenomenalism is referred
to several times in this text the following relevant part of it is refereed
already here.
Berkeley describes his model of knowledge in the first lines of Principles of Human Knowledge:
“It is evident to anyone
who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are
either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as
are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind,
or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either
compounding, dividing or barely representing those originally perceived in the
aforesaid ways.” ([Berkeley 88], § 1, my underlinings.)
“And as several of these
[ideas] are observed to accompany together, they come to be marked by one name,
and so to be reputed as one thing.” ([Berkeley 88], § 1, my underlining.)
This is referred to in the subsections “Phenomenalism in a realistic framing” and “A
top Down versus a bottom up explanation model”.
According to this view, we can acknowledge the sense impressions closely
by using what Berkeley calls the “operations of the mind” and thus create new
ideas in the mind, which can be acknowledged more closely by new operations of
the mind and by the imagination. I will with a neutral expression say that
Berkley’s model of knowledge is a “top down model of knowledge.
2.2.2 A
top Down versus a bottom up explanation model.
These concepts of top down a bottom up explanation model versus a bottom
up explanation model as a description of respectively anti-realism and realism
originate in my bachelor project, but is still usable, and is here rendered
without essential changes in these treatises. Here follows a short description
of these.
According to the top-down model of knowledge the
sense impressions are the originally real thing, the basis of our knowledge.
Thus, our concepts of objects are brought about by the regularity of the sense
impressions, as the sense patterns can be found in several sensations.
This model can be compared with its realist counterpart, a bottom-up model of knowledge:
According to this, our sense impressions are something we have as a goal
to explain. We do this based on an idea of a given basis, the matter. A basis
must have qualities based on whose other qualities can be explained, and this
must also itself be explained. So, the realists’ explanations are consciously
based on an understanding that still must be renewed.
2.2.1 The
sufficiency of the intern consistency of theories.
Naturally, theories only need to be internally consistent, not consistent
with common sense or the opponent’s ideas, though these may be commonly
accepted.
2.2.1.1 The allegation of holes in time.
Early in my philosophical education I was
confronted with the following erroneous statement:
If it is argued that it is not possible to
detect or justify that time should have a real existence, in the same way as we
imagine a straight line, then an opponent might criticize this allegation for
implying “holes in time”. However, this only makes up an interval inconsistency
under the presumption of the criticize ideas.
In other words, if someone advances that only
what can in fact be shown, exits, it cannot be asserted that there is a hole in
the corresponding view of time. For there is nothing in which there can be a
hole according to the above line of thought. That is only possible if a
continuous view of reality is assumed.
2.2.1.2 Phenomenalism in a realistic
framing.
A similar example is made up by similar criticisms of Berkeley’s
phenomenalism. As mentioned, this phenomenalism can shortly be outlined thus.
1) The literal concept of matter is superfluous. 2) We talk of a thing when we
are confronted with a collection of sensations with a certain regularity.
However, critics of idealism show a tendency to value it based on a
realist viewpoint, so that in the matter of case the idealism seems
self-contradicting, such as it is splendidly seen at Fredric Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, part
15:
“(...)
Andere sagen gar, die Außenwelt wäre das Werk unsrer Organe? Aber dann wäre ja
unser Leib, als ein Stück dieser Außenwelt, das Werk unsrer Organe! Aber dann
wären ja unsre Organe selbst - das Werk unsrer Organe!”
As to Berkeley’s model of cognition, however, the sense organs clearly
and obviously do not inter into the basis of them. On the contrary, our very
sense impressions and their regularity enters in this fundament.
Thus, Nietzsche presupposes a materially based bottom up model of our
knowledge in his criticism of Berkeley’s top down model of knowledge. Such a
view exactly expresses an “idealism on a
realistic framing”. The idealism has a practical problem, the concept of
thing. Thus, we can attempt to modify
the top-down model of knowledge by introducing “the concept of thing in an idealist framing” in this way: 1) A literal understanding of the
object of thing is unnecessary. 2)
We talk of a thing when we are confronted with a collection of sensations with
a certain regularity. However, understood as a psychological demonstration this
is strictly speaking what Berkeley concludes in the quotation above.
2.2.3
Conclusion to Best Explanation as an argument for the existence of
not-observable entities.
At a course in philosophy of science I have encountered the use of Conclusion to Best Explanation as an
argument for the existence of not-observable entities. However, this is
something quite different from using it to prove the existence of already known
entities and kinds of behaviour.
This Principle of Conclusion to Best Explanation can certainly be used
as to already known types of phenomena and behaviour, but not to justify any
literal existence of theoretical entities in natural sciences, which
presupposes the very sensibility in “talking about them”, which therefor must
first be made good.
I described and justified this criticism in my dissertation and have clarified
it in subsequent treatises.
2.2.4 Scientific
like argumentations in philosophy.
It must be remarked that the philosophical line of thought is not based
on collecting points in favour of a theory. Neither is it based on probability and neither
does it resemble natural science as to the demands to its results. Instead
philosophy deals with finding out what we have basically to do with.
2.2.4.1 Criticism of Kant’s refutation of
the idealism.
Thus, Immanuel Kant uses a scientific like explanation in his refutation
of the idealism. At the solution of an examination question, I encountered Kant’s
reasoning, but found it difficult to fit it into philosophically thinking:
Kant asserts that determination
of time presupposes something continuous in the observation. This cannot exist
in me, as my existence in time only can determined by this continuous trait. It
must therefore be outside me, and not thus as an idea about something outside
me. We must thus be dealing with real things that I sense outside me. ([Kant
76] B274 ff. my version.)
The reason is that Kant here says that there must be something
continuous as a basis of our cognition of time, in the same way as it is argued
in physics:
“The one end of the seesaw must have a higher specific gravity than the
other one for else it could not balance I that position (e.g. with the short
end lowest).”
Kant’s adherents must be able to explain what it means that the things
really exist – as something different from our sense impressions unavoidable
regularity. For more than this regularity we do not need. If we cannot point
out which difference this concluded existence can make up, it is just only
something we can imagine.
Not until later did I understand what the line of thought aimed at, as
the allegation that all determination of presupposes the existence of something
continuous is worded as if we can use a natural scientific argument in
philosophy which deals with something more basic.
3. The treatises.
3.1 Treatise No 1.
In this treatise, the aim and approach of the
treatises are explained, and our cognitive situation is illuminated with subjects
from the realism debate.
The treatise presents
a hic-et-nunc anti-realism. It is
based upon considerations about what we at most need to assume. Thus, we can
consistently assert that the only thing we deal with is our hic-et-nunc situation and its contents. Starting
from this, we can seek to clarify what we basically deal with. Such a clarification
must be released from unreflective common
sense opinions.
The treatise
consists of two parts. In the first part, the section “The aim of the treatise”,
it introduces the overall idea of the philosophy, which is presented in this
and the following treatises. Next, some important examples are discussed and
justified in the section “Our cognitive situation”.
The subsection “Our
existence in the world” goes through a number of basic subjects that are
elaborated in this and these treatises. In “Minimal suppositions” is described
how the discussion of them is based on investigations into what we can at most
put into our suppositions. As a counterpart of the predicate “reductionism”,
this philosophy is called “anti-introductionism”. Some of its basic ideas are
inspired by the philosophy of George Berkeley and of Michael Dummett.
These
clarifications lead to a metaphysical world picture, a clarified cognitive
basis as described in the subsection of this name “A metaphysical world
picture”. The consequences of this anti-realism are presented in the subsection
“Our here and now situation”, especially regards for the concept of time. The
subsection “Three different views of the notion of physical object” examines
how the concept of thing is understood by realism, phenomenalism and
anti-introductionism.
The subsection
“Proceed to the very matter” argues that philosophical questions must be
answered by examining the case itself and not by indirect solutions. The
subsection “The ordinary language” explains that our ordinary language can be
used in philosophy though thus usage may seem to imply realism.
The section “Our
cognitive situation” clarifies some of the mentioned subjects and new subjects.
The concept of thing, however, is further clarified in Treatise No 2.
In the subsection
“The basis of our clarifications” it is explained that we cognitively exit in a
situation, in which our knowledge hic-et-nunc
is given such as it is presented to us, i.e. without necessarily having to be
related to learning situations. The concept of assertability conditions is
taken up in the subsection “Existence and verification”. Here it is explained
how
the description of the
existence of an object coincidences with the verification procedure of the
existence of the object in question.
Moreover, it is
described how the world to we relate to, or rather all what we relate to, is
made up of the very fact that we receive impressions of different kinds. The
subsection “The physical world and our experience of it” describes the relation
between our talk about objects and 1) our sensations and 2) other persons'
sensations.
The subsection
“Theories and theoretical entities” describes how our sense impressions make up
the superior point of departure of our explanations. Thus, science describes
regularities found in nature by means of theoretical entities and
constructions, without this meaning that we must assume that these entities
exist in a literal sense in some way or other and cause the demonstrated regularities.
In the subsection
“Our body” it is explained how the concept of our sense organs is just a
derived concept, as in this connection we only must assume that we sense, as
this is the starting point of our explanations. The statement that we sense by
means of our sense organs just means that these are necessary to our sensation,
in the way that there is e.g. a necessary connection between our ears (which
existence we have a verification procedure) and our hearing, but not that the
sensation literally pass off that way and results
in sense experiences. The sense impressions that we, realistically expressed,
“have of our body” are thus related to our possibilities for having sense
impressions at all.
In the subsection
“Time”, it is explained how our concept of time can at most be said to be a way
of arranging our memories and experiences and fictions. Thus, in the subsection
“The past” it is put forward that statements about the past are just related to
memories and present so-called traces. This occasions some ethical objections,
which are therefore treated. In the subsection “Future” is described a
clarified understanding of the future. We have no reason to assume that there
is any continuation of our memories and our hic-et-nunc
situation. We can at most have to do with an imagination of the existence of
not-experienced experiences. The subsection “The present and past time and the
future of the past” refutes two counter arguments against the presented view of
the past. Moreover, is looked on the semantic meaning of the concept of
ongoing, not-observed processes.
The subsection
“Fictions and other persons’ consciousness” discusses to what we relate in
connection to the sufferings of not-observed persons. It cannot be so that we
relate to any situation in itself, as we do not have to do with such an entity,
just to our imaginations. But of course, we feel something, viz. in relations
to our uncertain fictions.
The section “Fictions and time” discusses the
fact that our concept of time must be understood in accordance with the idea
that the now is not a point in linear structure. The fact that, based on
our memories, we form fictions about a continued life can perhaps explain why
we let us carry away by literary and cinematic fictions.
3.2 Treatise No. 2.
In this treatise, it is substantiated that a
given structure by means of which the phenomena sprout up does not exist. For
that reason, we have to understand the world by means of a top down model, by
means of which we steadily interpret the phenomena, as opposed to a bottom up
model, which starts from an assumed not-observable basis. The difference
between realism and anti-realism is not primarily a question of existence, but
of our organising the world, of the direction of the explanation structure. Thus,
the difference is a question about a deep understanding of what kind of world
we live in.
The section “Three different views of the
concept of physical object” clarifies the view that realism, phenomenalism and
anti-introductionism respectively have on the concept of physical object, which
is touched on in Treatise No 1. The
important result is here that the principle of inference to the best
explanation cannot be used to conclude the literal existence of not-observable
objects. This is discussed in the subsection “Realism”. In the subsection
“Phenomenalism”, it is argued that the idea that we conceive an object based on
different sense qualities and thought processes is inconsistent. Moreover, the
concept of recognition is problematic in this connection. According to
anti-introduction, however, it can be argued that we simply sense an object as
a whole whose qualities we
thereafter can clarify.
The section “Top down and bottom up
explanations” describes how we can imagine a structure of explanations in which
references to our sensations are placed at the top and references to the latest
introduced theoretic results of science are placed at the bottom. Then,
antirealism can be described as a top down model of knowledge according to
which we, starting from the top, can give an account of the theoretic entities.
Realism can be described as a bottom up model of knowledge according to which
our goal is to explain our sense impressions on the basis of its bottom.
The section “The prototypical realism”
clarifies the linguistically senseless of the idea of other worlds. This can be
contrasted with the anti-introductionistic rejection of the concept of things
in itself, which is justified in the section “Anti-introductionistic
clarifications”.
In the section “The basis of scientific
explanations” it is substantiated that we cannot understand measured results as
anything else than the result of a measurement process, i.e. not as
representing any so-called underlying reality, as we have nothing to do with
such an entity.
The section “Time” clarifies that our ideas of
the fulfilment of our expectations in some future are only based on our
memories. Moreover, our fictions about the past have more premises than our
fictions about the future.
In the section “Cause and effect”, it is argued
that our imagination of an effect are only fictions based on our memories, as
we have no experiences originating from anything we can call “the future”. To
state a cause is only to refer to a demonstrated regularity.
In the section “The concept of psychical
energy” it is explained that just as we cannot talk about physical energy in
itself, we cannot maintain a concept of physical energy in itself, i.e. without
in the last end referring to observable phenomena.
In the section “Solipsism / other minds” it is
established that we cannot refer to anything we can call the other person’s
sense impressions as such as we cannot experience them but only refer to the
other person’s statements about it. This does not prevent us from using a
realist language, as we can interpret statements about other persons’
consciousness in a non-empty way. The question is just what we can put into
this usage. To me (the other person), using analogous considerations would be
to introduce a new kind of entity, though I have a concept of my own thoughts,
memories and sense impressions. However, we know that we are facing another
person that has a view of the world, in the sense that his behaviour and his
expressions can surprise us.
3.3 Treatise No. 3.
In
this treatise, it is argued that we are not ontologically committed by our usage. This
is done by means of a simple counterexample of such a commitment. The proof is
quite independent of the realism debate and frees the critics of the realism
from the demand that they have to express themselves ingeniously.
The section “Meaning and expression of
meaning” explains that it has no sense to talk about a statement having a
definite linguistic meaning which we approach at all. As to other persons’
statements, they cannot be description of not yet expressed, but present
thoughts. The same even applies to our own thoughts. W.V.O. Quine’s translation
considerations in his work Word and
Object are involved by way of introduction.
The
section “Not-observable entities” takes starting point in two of Grover
Maxwell’s arguments for the literal existence of so-called not-observable
entities in the article “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities” in
[Maxwell 62]. The first argument is an example of the extended use of the
principle of inference to best explanation and clearly illustrates the fallacy
of this argument. According to the other of these two arguments, we cannot draw
a sharp distinction between what is observable and what is not. Against this,
it can be argued that what we deal with are in all cases our sense impressions.
At the same time, it can be explained in which way that the concept of microbes
is a scientific construction.
The
problem of introduction is shed light on in the section “The problem of
induction in the light of a hic-et-nunc viewpoint”. The only thing we can deal
with as being real in this connection is our experiences of the fulfilment of
our expectations.
3.4 Treatise No. 4.
This
treatise has as the most important purposes of this treatise is to discuss the
parts of Michael Dummett's philosophy of language and of Bas van Fraassen's
philosophy of science that may concern Treatise No 1-3.
First, however, the importance of the semantic
element in the debate between realists and anti-realists is explained in the
section “The semantic approach the realism debate”.
The section “Berkeley’s phenomenalism” points
out the realistic elements of Berkeley’s phenomenalism is pointed out and
opposed to the anti-introductionistic view. It is made clear how Berkeley’s
project is different from that of Dummett.
The section “Dummett's anti-realism” presents
and discusses Dummett’s definitions of realism and anti-realism. However, first
it discusses Dummett’s fundamental ides of discussing statements and entities
rather than entities.
The section “A clarification of the concept of
object” first clarifies Dummett’s view on the concept of object, which is
compared with Berkeley’s philosophy. Thereafter is looked at the
anti-introductionistic view on the concept of object.
The section “Subjects in the realism debate”
looks at general subjects and specific examples: Realism and anti-realism must
be defended by means of concepts that do not presuppose the respective
directions themselves. This demand is satisfied unproblematically for the
latter. It is shown that Kant expresses an extraordinary realism with his
concept of a thing in itself, which builds on semantically unclarified ideas.
The section “States and imaginations” first
presents some examples of statements and imaginations that according to
realists can be simply true. Next, our fault is made clear: Inspired by what we
know of, we imagine situations whose descriptions only apparently have semantic
meaning.
The section “Fictions and meaning” examines our
possibilities for making semantically meaningful imaginations. Our imaginations
of the past are yet an example of the above-mentioned kind of imaginations.
Dummett’s view of the reality of past is criticized.
In “The correspondence theory of truth”, the
principle of this name is criticized; in this way, the anti-introductionistic
view of anti-realism is clarified. Thus, it is concluded that the
correspondence of a statement with reality is identical to what the
justification of the statement consists of.
In “The importance of the top down line of thought”, the top
down principle as an argument for anti-realism is treated.
The section “Truth and semantic meaning”
compares 1) statements about truth and existence with 2) statements about
semantic meaning. This can be exemplified with ideas advanced by Friedrich
Nietzsche and Henri Bergson. Statements about statements’ semantic meaning can
be concluded to be the strongest of the mentioned two kinds of statements.
Realistic criticism of this is discussed.
The section “Bas van Fraassen's constructive
empiricism” looks at basic elements of van Fraassen’s philosophy of science. Van
Fraassen’s literal understanding of scientific statements can be criticised for
not having semantic meaning just as his criticism of Grover Maxwell’s view of
observability is insufficient. Contrary to this, van Fraassen’s view of the
concept of model can be a solution. Problems with that are discussed however.
The section “A critique of realism as a good
explanation” criticises the contention that realism is a good explanation of
the progress of science and that it thus must be assumed. This issue is
important in the discussion of scientific realism.
3.5 Treatise No. 5.
Next, occurrences of semantically meaningless
statements about existence and non-existence are examined. It has appeared that
sentences can be senseless for an even more fundamental reason than their
possible proof transcendence, viz. the fact that one or more putative words in
a sentence lack semantic sense. Nevertheless, these putative words may borrow
an appearance from words that obviously have semantic meaning, but this does not
make them semantically meaningful. This applies to certain uses of the sign
sequences “external world” and “god”. However, also the further ideas the
realists will put in their understanding of the expressions “not-observable
entities” and “material objects”, compared to anti-introductionism, are
semantically empty. This is expounded in the section “Semantic senselessness –
semantic emptiness”.
Some references concerning philosophical concepts
in a Danish lexicon, [Gyldendal 2006] expose an unsuccessful approach to the
described concepts. This concerns the mutually related subjects, phenomenalism,
the problem of the external world, and solipsism. This criticism is
substantiated concurrently with a discussion of the involved problems. It is
put forward in the section “Critique of an account of phenomenalism, the
problem of the external world, and solipsism”. The crucial error in the
criticized articles is that the anti-realistic aspects of the subjects are
explained exclusively from a realistic point of view. This is elucidated
further in subsection “The realist’s conception of anti-realism”.
This criticism occasions a substantiation of the
idea that philosophy can be practised in a scientific way in the sense that
specific demands can be made on philosophical arguments. These are put forward
in the section “Philosophy as science”.
The section “The velocity of time” advances some
considerations about the absurdity of the concept of the velocity of time.
These considerations have contributed to the anti-introductionistic philosophy
of time presented in these treatises, and they properly belong to the first
presentation of this philosophy.
In the section “Science and reality”, some
questions based on Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, the way it is presented
in his work The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions ([Kuhn 70]), are gone through. Certainly, this philosophy
mainly deals with scientific work, but it also touches the realism debate. This
debate is especially involved in the subsection “The idea of a final scientific
truth about the world”. The subsection “Is Newton’s physics a special case of
Einstein’s theory of relativity at small velocities?” discusses the relation
between the purpose of the scientific theories (i.e. to predict the phenomena)
and the contents of the theories. Kuhn nearly literally asserts that scientists
work in a different world after a paradigm change, which is discussed in the
subsection “Do scientists relate to different worlds before and after a
paradigm change?”
This occasions a thoroughgoing clarification of
the relation between science and the world. This is undertaken in the
subsequent section, “The relation between science and the world, especially the
past”.
Finally, it is argued that religious statements
are semantic meaningless sign sequences. This result is a by-product of
anti-introductionism, though it deals with the basal subject word meaning. The arguments are put forward in the section “Semantic
critique of religious sequences of signs”. Here it is substantiated that the
religious use of the written characters or sounds “belief” and “god” make the
sentences that contain them semantically empty. On the one hand, they borrow an
appearance of semantic meaning from the not-religious terms “belief”, which is
synonymous with “presumption” and “trust”, and “God”, which resembles a name;
on the other hand, none of them can be given a self-contained semantic meaning
religious persons can explain to others.
3.6 Treatise No. 6.
As the concept
of semantic meaning is basic to any discussion, of course it is necessary to
elucidate and define it. This is done in the section “The concept of semantic
meaning”.
The section
“Different sorts of arguments against realism” evaluates arguments against
realism within different areas. It appears that some of these realisms lack
semantic meaning in nearly the same degree as religious sequences of signs do.
Within other fields, the debate is contingent on empiric facts.
The criticism of
religious sentences for being semantic senseless is followed up by an answer to
the question of how we can criticize a person’s utterance if it is semantically
senseless. This is possible by scrutinizing the ideas that with their appearance
of semantic sense have induced the person in question to put forward his sentences.
This is illustrated by an example in the section “How semantic senseless
sentences can be criticized”.
The section
“The anti-introductionistic project” presents the account of an, at least in
these treatises, renewed and clarified view of the realist debate as being
about what we are confronted with or have to do with, in contrast to what are
just ideas and constructions. As this question concerns demonstrable facts, the
realism debate is finally extricated from being about existence versus not-existence.
Next, the text
discusses the relation between the appearance of a body and its so-called
inherent qualities, i.e. qualities that are apparently not sensed immediately,
but are derived. These concepts are illuminated in the section “The concept of
so-called not-observable qualities”. The result proves to be usable to the
clarification of the mind-body problem.
To
anti-introductionism, the mind-body problem involves the demand for
interpreting scientific theories about how a person’s ingestion of something
materiel can affect his physical and mental impressions, without this
interpretation having to refer to anything else than phenomena and theories.
This interpretation involves a clarification of the concept of processes,
especially physiological ones. Moreover, the question of what can actually be
phenomena is discussed. This takes place in the section “The mind-body problem
in anti-introductionistic elucidation”.
Though Alfred
Ayer maintains the opposite idea, it is in fact possible to argue for the existence
of a moral basis of our actions. The existence of this basis is made good in
the section “Ethics and politics”. First, however, it is explained why we do
not necessarily follow our moral conclusions. This takes place in the
subsection “Moral point of view and action”. The subsection, “The basis of
ethics”, takes as a starting point the fact that the world is the world to us,
viz. in the sense that the individual’s horizon or world of ideas is determined
by his knowledge, such that clarification and increase of knowledge increase
this horizon. This means that if we want to argue and conclude anything at all,
we must inquire into many different subjects. As we exactly seek an answer to
the question about the basis of ethics, the basis is thus given, viz. that we
must have good possibilities of clarification. This leads to the basis of
ethics and politics. Finally, some counter-arguments are discussed and some
examples of consequences of this basis are shown.
3.7 Treatise No. 7.
The treatise starts with reproductions
of three contributions from my blog Arguments
(http://ovemk2.blogspot.dk/). This has the following reasons:
Treatise No 6 ended with an investigation of
whether there is an objective justification of ethics. This investigation
appeared to be indirect, as it was based on the necessity of an interest in
finding a solution, and as the interest in debating a question does not
immediately seem to have anything to do with the answer to it.
Here the problem is reconsidered and
supplementary clarifications of the core of the matter is advanced. This takes
place in the first section, “An ethical basis”.
Treatise No 5 ended with the section “Semantic
critique of religious sequences of signs”. In the meantime, I have been more
explicitly acquainted with the concept of ignosticism,
which may seem to comprise this criticism of religious expressions. There is a
decisive difference, however. This is made clear in the section “Ignosticism
and semantic meaning”.
This contribution referred to
another contribution, which therefore is first reproduced. This is done in the
section “Presuppositions in religion and the realism debate”, which among other
things presents the two most basal presuppositions that can be thought of.
These are made in all statements. They are illustrated with examples of
erroneous presuppositions.
Like the first three, the fourth
subject belongs to practical philosophy. The discussion of it is occasioned by
some often-heard excuses of and accusations against
religions in connection to persons’ religiously related objectionable
behaviour: The religions are respectively called innocent or guilty. As religious texts involve the extra problem
that they are semantically meaningless, it can be clarifying first to look at
the isms since these have a semantic content that can be discussed. Besides
being semantically meaningful, the isms can contain well-founded ideas.
Contrary to this, there can be no religiously justified ideas. It is concluded
that people themselves chose to act, whether this happens on the background of
an ism or a religion. This subject is treated in the section “Religion, isms and
responsibility”.
3.8 Treatise No. 8.
This treatise deals with Zeno’s
so-called paradoxes about movement. These are known from Aristotle’s rendition
of them. This is presented in the anthology The
Presocratic Philosophers ([Kirk 83], p. 270-274), inclusive some of Aristotle’s
and the article author M. Schofield’s considerations.
The paradox about Achilles and the tortoise is the paradox
Aristotle calls “the so-called ‘Achilles’”:
“In a race the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since
the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started, so that the
slower must always hold a lead.” (239b14) ([Kirk 70], p. 272)
This treatise uses
the designation, “Zeno’s dichotomy account” several times. This account enters
as a part of the dichotomy paradox:
“... The first [paradox] asserts the non-existence of motion on the
ground that that which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage
before it arrives at the goal...” (239b11) ([Kirk 70], p. 270, my square
bracket.)
Zeno’s dichotomy account is simply the latter statement:
“that which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage
before it arrives at the goal” (239b11) ([Kirk 70], p. 270)
1) In the first part a number of
immediate considerations concerning these paradoxes. Moreover, some often
critics put forward are refuted, and further analyses is advanced.
It is advanced that Achilleus
catches the tortoise because the length of the stretch Achilleus needs to run
to reach the tortoise is the limit value
of a sum-function. However, on the contrary, the definition of the concept
of limit value reflects how it is possible to come arbitrarily close to a point
without reaching it. This is clarified in the subsection “Mathematical limit”.
As this account is clearly
recursive, though without a stop, formal recursive descriptions of them are put
forward. These descriptions are supplemented by examples.
It
proves that a help to the solution of these paradoxes is found in (a) this
recursive way they are told. Moreover, the right understanding of the concept
of infinity proves to dissolve a possible paradox concerning (b) how we can have accomplished infinitely many
partial passages (in a finite space of time). This corresponds to being in the
now and thinking of a just performed run, i.e. of a past-construction of it.
2) The second part advances a clarified interpretation of Zeno’s account.
According to this, these accounts do not make up paradoxes, but a message. This
interpretation directly takes as its starting point how the accounts are told.[2]
It
is explained 1) why we shall not take common sense as a starting point, and 2)
why we must address the most difficultly refutable version of the statement one
wants to scrutinize or criticize.
It
is made clear that the right recursive dichotomy paradox can be understood
either 1) retrospectively but directed to the now or 2) prospectively from the
now and directed towards a certain future moment.
In
the last resort Zeno’s account must be understood as an abstract fiction that
is freed from references to physical and theoretical entities.
It is explained how Zeno’s paradoxes makes clear that there is a dualism
between the now and the past, and between the now and the future.
Litteratur.
[Berkeley
Penguin Books (London
Penguin Books (
[Dummett
78] Michael Dummett: Truth and
other Enigmas
Duckworth (London
Duckworth (
[Fraassen
80] Bas C. van Fraassen: The
Scientific Image
Oxford University
Press (Oxford
[Kuhn 70] Thomas S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition, Enlarged
The University of Chicago Press
(Chicago 1970).
The University of Chicago Press
(Chicago 1970).
[2]
The interpretation is inter
alia based on my considerations in connection to the writing of the treatise A criticism of W.C. Salmon’s Zeno’s
Paradoxes, which addresses some of the contributions to Wesley C. Salmon’s
anthology Zeno’s Paradoxes ([Salmon
70]). Though this treatise mainly resulted in the pointing out the misleading
digressions and other errors in these contributions, the very work with this
criticism has resulted in further considerations about Zeno’s runner paradoxes
besides those put forward in the first part).
