Contents.

This treatise presents a hic-et-nunc anti-realism, i.e. a philosophy based upon considerations concerning what we at most have to assume. Thus we can consistently assert that the only thing that exists is our hic-et-nunc situation and its contents. Taking this as our point of departure, we can give a structured explanation of our understanding of the world.

The treatise consists of two parts. In the first section “The aim of the treatise” it introduces the overall idea of the philosophy, which is presented in this and the following treatises. Next, important examples are discussed and justified in the section “Our cognitive situation”.

The subsection “Our existence in the world” goes through a number of basic subjects that are elaborated in this and the following treatises. In “Minimal suppositions” is described how the discussion of them is based on investigations into what we can at most put into our suppositions. As a counterpart of the predicate “reductionism”, this philosophy is called “anti-introductionism”. Some of its basic ideas are inspired by the philosophy of George Berkeley and Michael Dummett.

These clarifications lead to a metaphysical world picture, a clarified cognitive basis as described in the subsection of this name “A metaphysical world picture”. The consequences of this anti-realism are presented in the subsection “Our here and now situation”, notably as for the concept of time. The subsection “Three different views of the notion of physical object” it is examines how the concept of thing is understood by realism, phenomenalism and anti-introductionism.

The subsection “Proceed to the very matter” argues that philosophical questions must be answered by examining the case itself and not by indirect solutions. The subsection “The ordinary language” explains that our ordinary language can be used in philosophy though thus usage may seem to imply realism.

The section “Our cognitive situation” clarifies some of thee mentioned subjects and new subjects. The concept of thing, however, is further clarified in Treatise No 2.

In the subsection “The basis of our clarifications” it is explained that we cognitively exits in a situation, in which our knowledge hic-et-nunc is given in its own right, i.e. without having to be related to learning situations. The concept of assertability conditions is taken up in the subsection “Existence and verification”. Here it is explained how the description of the existence of an object coincidences with the verification procedure of the existence of the object. Moreover it is described how the world to which we relate is made up of the very fact that we receive impressions of different kinds. The subsection “The physical world and our experience of it” describes the relation between our talk about objects and 1) our sensations and 2) other persons' sensations.

The subsection “Theories and theoretical entities” describes how our sense impressions make up the superior point of departure of our explanations. This science describes found regularities in nature by means of theoretical entities and constructions, without our having to assume that these entities exist in a literal sense somehow and cause the demonstrated regularities.

In the subsection “Our body” it is explained how the concept of our sense organs is just a derived concept, as we only have to assume that we senses, as this is the starting point of our explanations. The fact that we senses by means of our sense organs just means that these are necessary to our sensation, not that the sensation literally pass off that way and result in sense experiences. The sense impressions we, realistically expressed, “have of our body” are also related to our possibilities for having sense impressions at all.

In the subsection “Time”, it is explained that our concept of time can at most be said to be a way of arranging our memories and experiences and fictions. Thus, in the subsection “The past” it is put forward that statements about the past are just related to memories and present so-called traces. This occasions some ethical objections, which are therefore treated. In the subsection “Future” is described a clarified understanding of the future. We do not have to assume that there is any continuation of our memories and our here-situation. We can at most have to do with an imagination of the existence of not-experienced experiences. The subsection “The present and past time and the future of the past” refutes two counter arguments against the presented view of the past. As the one of these arguments involves the future they are not discussed until here. Moreover is looked on the semantic meaning of the concept of ongoing, not-observed processes.

The subsection “Fictions and other persons’ consciousness” discusses to what we relate in connection to the sufferings of not-observed persons. It cannot be so that we relate to any situation in itself, as we do not have to do with such an entity, just to our imaginations. But of course we feel something, viz. in relations to our uncertain fictions.

The section “Fictions and time” discusses the fact that our concept of time must be understood in accordance with the idea that the now is not a point in linear structure. The fact that, based on our memories, we form fictions about a continued life can perhaps explain why we let us carry away by literary and cinematic fictions.

1. The aim of the treatise.

1.1 Our existence in the world.

The chief aim of this treatise is to find a basis for clarifying a number of philosophical questions, e.g. the meaning of the statement that we exist in the world as thinking and perceiving beings. This clarification of course involves a inquiry into what the world is, i.e. inter alia into what it means that there are physical objects in the world, what physical objects are, and what matter is, and how we exist in the world. The same clarification also involves an inquiry into what we at most can put into the concept of time. For these reasons, this project is semantic. It appears that the answer to the question of what past time is has features in common with the answer to the question what physical objects are.

At least it is these goals that will be aimed at here, not by giving the imagination free rein, but on the contrary, by bringing into focus what we at most need to assume, and by this, what may be discarded as unnecessary and unfounded. The discussion does not primarily deal with existence or not-existence of different kinds of entities, but with the semantic meaning of our statements about these. This involves a clarification which turns our metaphysical picture of the world upside down.

A characteristic of our concept of past time, and of future time, and of the material world is that we possess some sporadic experiences, which can be referred to in a comprehensive structure of explanations, of which a great part consists of fictions about the past and future and objects not sensed pro term. Some parts of this structure consist of our actively elaborated scientific constructions, whereas other parts are the results of analyses of our perceptions into constituent parts. Of course the work with this can interplay. It also appears that the most basic feature of our understanding of our existence is that we only need assume that we exist in a situation in which we interpret and clarify our impressions, and that this is all what there are for us to relate to. For this reason, this philosophy is a hic-et-nunc anti-realism.

Though this assertion about our situation is not solipsistic, it may be objected that the thought might lead to solipsism. This can be refuted, however, among other things because we are able to communicate with each other about our experiences. However, this subject demands a separate treatment.

It may also be advanced that the assertion implies realism about the contents of other persons’ consciousness, and that this philosophy thus conflict with itself. For according to a realistic way of thinking, the fact that we are able to communicate may be due to the fact that our experiences resemble each other to some sufficient degree, literally understood. However, the matter can be expounded differently:

There is no more in the fact that our experiences resemble each other than that we can communicate about them.

Thus, the fact that we can communicate just means that we have memories of our own verifications of other persons’ statements and of other persons’ reasonably adequate reactions to our statements. The fact that our experiences resemble each other, and that we can exchange information of them and discuss them at all, are two sides of the same coin; thus, we talk about “exchanging experiences”.

This is of course true even if we presume that it has meaning to talk about small dissimilarities between sensations of two individuals. It even applies whether the persons in question have so-called defective sensory faculties or not. For, in any case, we are able to exchange information about our sensations to some extent.

Two sorts of objections may be raised against this hic-et-nunc anti-realism: 1) that it is contra-intuitive, and 2) that it implies some problems concerning ethical questions. However, it can be maintained that the opposite is true: As to point 1 the contra intuitivity, the fact that an exposure of our cognitive situation leads to contra-intuitive results is not a weakness. On the contrary, we ought to be content with such an uncovering as it exposes some of our ingrained mistakes. As regards point 2, the ethical questions, these only concern the domains of ethics and philosophy of actions themselves, not the hic-et-nunc philosophy itself. For in this way, we have just uncovered some problems in these domains. These are discussed below.

1.2 Minimal suppositions.

As mentioned, the principle of this hic-et-nunc anti-realism is to assume only what is necessary and thus also to discount unnecessary common sense. Therefore, it is necessary to find out what we at most have to assume, what we can at most put into our assumptions, and what are only superfluous assumptions.

Thus, we do not have to presume that what exists is in any way different from or is anything more then what is contained in the conditions for asserting statements about its attributes and its existences, i.e. its assertion conditions. This means that we can only assert that something exist if we have observed that its assertion conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, it must be observed that a description of its existence resembles a description of the fulfilment of these assertion conditions. With other words:

We cannot put more into a statement about the existence of an object than what is contained in the assertion conditions of the statement about its existence. The analogous considerations apply to statements about its features.

The fact that we make our own understanding of our impressions does not mean that we make our own world, at least not in a literal sense. However, it must be admitted that this plain but clarifying idea is due to George Berkeley:

According to Berkeley “the objects of human knowledge” certainly originates from ideas of different kinds, which he explains in this way:

”And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing.” ([Berkeley 88], §1, p. 53)

- Nevertheless, Berkeley also states clearly:

”When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or not, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view;” ([Berkeley 88], §29, p. 63, my underlining)

Thus, we do not, quite freely, create our own world. (Insane persons may, in some sense, create their own world, but they have to fight against their sensations.)

Put in other words we are not master of our sense impressions, other things being equal. However, the way our situation can be described, in a special sense we live in the middle of what we experience as the world, as each of us receives impressions, which we can reflect on and discuss.

As some of the formulations and statements in this text, such as the above statements about assertion conditions, at least partly, are inspired by Dummett, this is made clear:

According to Dummett (Realism (1963 in [Dummett 78]) the realism debate can be understood as a discussion whether names of e.g. material objects have reference. Dummett believes, however, that the same does not apply to phenomenalism:

”(...) phenomenalism seems to be better described as the view, that material objects are reducible to (constructions out of) sense-data, than as the view, that there are no such things as material objects or that names of material objects do not really stand for anything.” ([Dummett 78], p. 146)

As it will later be justified, on the one hand it cannot be maintained that our ideas of material objects are constructions literally understood, such as Berkeley conceives it, as this apprehension is too rough and presupposes the common sense concept of time. On the other hand, it is true that it can be advanced that names of material objects do refer; however it will also be discussed to which sorts of objects they refer and how they refer. To this purpose, the following specification, which Dummett proposes, seems to be useful:

”(...) I shall take as my preferred characterisation of a dispute between realists and anti-realists one which represents it as relating, not to a class of entities or a class of forms, but to a class of statements, which may be e.g. statements about the physical world, (...)” ([Dummett 78], p. 146, my underlining)

The use of the concept of statement makes the discussion of realism easier. We may now discuss whether statements about material objects are reducible to statements about sense impressions.

In the article The Reality of the Past (1969) Dummett asserts that the disputes for and against realism is best described as discussions about statements of a certain general type. ([Dummett 78], p. 358)

Thus, Dummett describes anti-realism as the view that the meanings of statements in the disputed class are not given by conditions that can exist independently of our possible knowledge, but by “the conditions we recognise as establishing the truth or falsity of a statements of that [the disputed] class”. ([Dummett 78], p. 358/9, my square brackets.)

This has a certain similarity to the assertion above that we cannot attribute more to the meaning of a statement about an object than what is contained in the conditions for asserting that statement about this object.[1]

Certainly, we draw up the assertion conditions ourselves, but of course we do not master what we sense, so the assertion conditions of true statements about empirical matters are given by what we sense. However, science is able to construct or lay down assertion conditions of the existence of certain, defined entities, which in this sense may be asserted to exist in a scientific model when the assertion conditions are satisfied. The assertion conditions of the existences of an object are rightly assertion conditions of statements about the existence of the object, i.e. of the truth of such statements - for we do not assert the existence of objects but statements about objects.

After the discarding of the superfluous assumptions about existence, the question is how the remaining world picture coheres and whether the clarification of this may lead to new knowledge.

For instance, it is true of literary fictions that it benefits the understanding of the contents or the message of the text to discard the assumption that the persons of a novel somehow have a definite past. Certainly, a reading of the text under the latter assumption is tempting, especially if it resembles a description of our own memories. However, this assumption may lead to misunderstanding of the text as statements about the protagonist's past does not possess meaning if they are neither included in the text nor derivable from it. Therefore, adding such assumptions changes the message of the text. On the other hand, not putting more into the interpretation of the text than what it expresses and what may logically be concluded from it, leads directly towards an understanding of the message of the text.

The rejection of superfluous assumptions implies that the remaining assumptions get a different meaning in their new and thinned context. For instance, the word “now” gets a different meaning by new constructions of the concepts of past and future.

Phenomenalism is often referred to as a “reductionism”, as it is alleged to want to reduce our talk about objects to a talk about sense impressions. We can just as well say that the fact is that the realists introduce unnecessary concepts, namely the concept of objects that exist in themselves somehow. Thus, realism can be called “introductionism”, while the anti-realism that does not introduce anything superfluous can be called “anti-introductionism”. This term can applied to the hic-et-nunc realism presented in this treatise and the succeeding ones. Besides this, no more neologisms are intended to be introduced in these treatises.

1.3 A metaphysical world picture.

The realist may believe to possess an easily understood picture of his concept of reality, a picture that is more extensive than the anti-realist's picture of reality. However, this realist picture can at most be a picture of the known world, postulated extended to be a picture of a not-known enlargement of the known world in space and time (which is supposed to have meaning). In this way, however, we do not form pictures of something that we can call a picture of the whole world in a realist sense, but only pictures which derive from something we know.

By means of the anti-introductionism a semantically justified metaphysical picture of reality is obtained. This picture will show how our metaphysical view of the world will look like if we do not assert more than what we need. It is questionable whether it is possible, at all, meaningfully to assert more than what we need to assert about the world, especially if we demand that it must be possible to account for the semantic meaning our descriptions of what we experience about the world. For all other statements would just be arbitrary additions.

1.4 Our here and now situation.

We only need assume that each singular being is situated in what may be roughly described as a here and “now” situation - a situation that makes up our whole reality. The word “now” is here put into quotation marks because the referred concept of a now is not a now among past and future nows, as we do not have to assume the literal sense of the concept of these nows... According to that assumption it is strictly speaking misleading to speak about a now, as we cannot attribute meaning to our talk about a not-now. The reason is that statements that cannot be negated are meaningless or empty.

This thinning out our assumptions is possible because it is sufficient to assume that our memories are only memory impressions, and that our conclusions about our future are only fictions based upon analogous considerations. Therefore, it is more precise to assert that we are situated in a pure here-situation.

We only need to assume that what we call “the past” is identical to the totality of our memories, fictions based on present traces (so-called evidences of past actions), and relations between these.

Correspondingly, the only concept of a future we can have is a fiction describing another here-situation where the now is assumed to be replaced by new nows, similar to our arrangement of past times. Such fictions are based upon our knowledge, our memory impressions, and our present time, plus mutual relations between elements from this set.

Thus, we cannot assert that the now is a moment in a literally existing space of time, as point on a time axis, but only that it is the situation in which we are situated, a situation that enables us to act. In fact, space to act is left as the now is not just a point on a time axis, not like a thin slice of a rope made of coloured threads, and as time is not like a number of snap shots placed after each other. The time axis is just one way of arranging our memories and fiction. This raises a number of questions, which will be attempted to be answered later.

1.5 Three different views of the notion of physical object.

According to realism, an object is typically something that exists independently of an interpretation, and which causes our sensory impressions. This is maintained by realism, although we exactly only know the object by means of these sensations. Thus, this concept implies the idea about the existence of something else besides our known sensations, something that we do not know, namely an object per se. This metaphysical assertion demands an argument.

According to phenomenalism, we may talk about an object when we receive a set of sense impressions that seem to have a regular behaviour to some degree. This ascertainment, however, presupposes a process whose contents we must know (in order to be in accordance with phenomenalism), but the author of this treatise has never experienced such contents and it is doubtful whether other persons know it. The idea of hidden processes does not seem to be in the spirit of phenomenalism.

The anti-introductionistic view is simpler:

According to anti-introductionism, we simply sense an object as a whole, whose features we can subsequently clarify. Only what is actually clarified can we assert exist, and it only has meaning to talk about what we can clarify according to what we know.

Thus, there is nothing hidden in this worldview, and neither any unnecessary assertions of existence.

1.6 Proceed to the very matter.

Beyond assuming as little as possible, it is a principle of the reasoning in this text to proceed to the very matter and avoid indirect reasoning. For philosophical thinking exactly deals with understanding the case itself by clarifying it and reach solutions on this basis. As the primary thing, this demands a clarification of the involved concepts and statements. It is naturally excellent if other fields can inspire the philosophizing person to find solutions, only the results must still be obtainable from the matter itself. Of course, the point is not to find solutions that do not support viewpoints which the philosophizing person rejects.

This means (because these principles are as fundamental as they are) that results leading to problems at another domain but not to inconsistencies with already obtained results are problems belonging to the domain in question itself. Certainly, these secondary problems can be said to be related to the first obtained results and they must of course be resolved, but that must be done in the light of these clarifications. To work at these implied problems and still maintain the more fundamental results may turn up to be rewarding for an understanding of the secondary domain.

1.7 The ordinary language.

In this presentation, the ordinary language is used though it has been influenced by a number of implicit assumptions that are not in accordance with the anti-introductionism, in the way these preconditions are usually conceived. For instance, the use of the verb “to uncover” may seem to presuppose realism. Therefore, some of the wordings in this text are interpretable in a way that obviously contradicts earlier advanced assertions. Certainly, this is avoidable by continuous repetitions of earlier specifications, but such repetitions would naturally make the account too extensive, and moreover it would be an unreasonable demand.

Furthermore, we are not able to construct a different language, because it would depend on our ordinary language, as it has to be defined by means of this. Under any circumstances, such a language would possess only a limited set of means of expressions, as these would have to be defined one by one. It is true, that we might imagine quite a different language, organically developed and based on a different worldview, but as we do not possess such a language this imagination cannot help us.

2. Our cognitive situation.

2.1 The basis of our clarifications.

Basically, we are situated in a clarifying hic-et-nunc situation, as mentioned above, understood such that based on our knowledge, including our theories and experience, and our sense impressions we form new theories and views. But not only does our sense impressions exist in their own right, we have a knowledge hic-et-nunc that exists in its own right. Thus, we are in possession of applicable concepts of physical objects and colours and other qualities, concepts that we suppose to understand and that function in some sense. The fact that we may relate these concepts to memory impressions and especially to memory impressions of learning situations and to theories is a secondary fact in this connection.[2] It is sufficient that our concepts are applicable and function in our here-situation, at least in principle, for we may of cause fail. Moreover, it is this framework of understanding, which is the point of departure of our cognition:

2.1.1 Existence and verification.

What does it mean that a thing exists at a certain place, e.g. that there is a vase on a table? That a thing exists means that a number of definite are present. A statement about that can be made based on a number of fulfilled conditions, the assertability conditions of the statement. These consist of certain visual impressions, impressions of touch, etc., and other persons’ statements about what they have seen, e.g. a vase on a table. It must be noticed that the following conclusion can be drawn:

The description of the existence of an object G and the description of the verification procedure for the existence of G are two sides of the same coin.

In other words, existence is existence according to a verification procedure. Cf. also Dummett’s definition of anti-realism, referred above. Thus, the statement, “The entity E exists” is true if we are able to obtain evidence of it by means of a verification procedure.

Thus, the description of such a verification procedure expresses an understanding of what it means that the entity E exists, that is, an understanding of what has to be satisfied to make it possible to assert that E exists. The point is that we do not need to attribute more than this to such statements about existence. To assert the existence of E is to assert that we are able to verify the existence of E, i.e. that we are able to perform exactly those observations, analyses and calculations that a positive result of the verification procedure implies. Thus these results, found by observations, analyses and calculations, can be said to make up the construction of the semantic the contents of our talk about the existence E.

There are different kinds of evidences. The assertion of existence of elementary particles in nuclear physics has a different kind of evidence than the assertion of existence of entities in the sensuous world. We are not only able to measure the spatial dimensions of a stone, we are also able to see and feel its rough spatial dimensions, etc. Thus, a stone is not just a construction based on measurements.

Certainly, we can be said to face a world to which we relate, but that world is the very fact that we are situated in a situation in which we receive impressions of different sorts. Thus, this world is at once our impressions and our relating to these impressions, which especially include our sense impressions of what we call the objects of the physical world.

We are certainly able to imagine a fabulous animal, even model it in clay, but quite generally, many of our imaginations about whet there is in the world are empty. It is a question whether we can in fact imagine the existence of something, which we cannot imagine. Even if it is not possible to imagine this, some persons may assert that it may exist, and for that reason it is so easy to support common sense. We base a great part of our worldview of that sort of persistent belief.

2.1.2 The physical world and our experience of it.

We sense both details and wholes: tones as well as melodies, colours as well as objects, etc. The question is whether there can be physically more in the world than what we can describe by reference to our sensations.

Sensations are sensations of the individual; which is in accordance with what is contained in the concept of sensation. Thus, everyone is in his individually apprehending situation. The person A's sensations may have features in common with the person B's sensations, or rather: A's description of A's sensations may have features in common with B's description of B's sensations. Obviously, the persons A and B are able to exchange information about something that we may call “the same experiences”. At least, they are able to talk with each other about nearly the same experiences, in the sense nearly identical descriptions of experiences. In A's case, they may be A's experiences, and in B's case, they may be B's possible or expected experiences, for instance, the person A may recommend B to go to a certain place (expecting B to understand the description of that place and to obtain the same sense impressions).

As above discussed with reference to Berkeley, I do not myself control what I see in a given situation, and I assume that all other persons will be subject to by and large the same sensations in the same or a similar situation, or at least that they will make descriptions which are similar to each other and to my description of my sensations. In this sense and under these conditions, we are able to assert, “The seen thing exists for A, and for B and for me”.

What I perceive as objects with such and such features is not something that I put together. On the contrary, at my first or immediate perception of these objects I perceive them as these wholes: wholes having such and such features in some sense. This is contrary to Berkeley’s view, which has been referred above. Some may assert that a thing called “the brain” performs a preliminary work for me, without my being conscious of that. However, that would be to make an unnecessary assumption, which implies an ontology that demands an argument, and a clarification of the dualism problem.

The physical objects that I see exist for me in my here and now situation, as wholes. Nevertheless, in my understanding, as mentioned, I am able conceptually to map out these objects in constituent parts, which I may relate to each other.

We do not need to assert that physical objects exist and that these objects possess attributes in another way and in another respect than described above. It is not necessary to assume that objects exist “in itself” either, i.e. independent of an interpretation or how they can be described.

2.1.3 Theories and theoretical entities.

We may observe objects and attributes of objects and constellations of objects, and these observations we are able to clarify. By application of theories and experiments, science is able to find regularities in its observations, and it may attempt to describe these regularities by means of formulas and constants plus theoretical constructions and models. On the other hand, we do not need to assume that these entities already exist somehow[3] and subsequently cause the found regularities, the qualities of the object and our visual impressions. We only need assume that we are situated in a clarifying hic-et-nunc situation, where we can find more and more regularities and relations in our observations. The hic-et-nunc view of time makes it necessary to expound the concept “continually”, which can be done on the basis of our memories: We possess memories or knowledge of elaborations, and these we can increase in our here-situation. This will be exemplified below.

The assumption that if the elementary particles had not been of a certain kind or had a certain mass, the basis for all biological existence would disappear completely, is completely mistaken. For it is simply a fact that we exist as sensing, recollecting and thinking beings, and therefore, the case is the other way about:

It is only a test criterion for the validity of scientific theories that they must be in accordance with our existence.

We communicating beings and our sense impressions are therefore what primarily exist, i.e. make up the primary starting point of our explanations, while everything else are assumptions and constructions based on observations and experiments. Thus, concept of the electron and its qualities is just a useful assumption or simply the symbol of a set of different kinds of measured values; and thus, and its mass is a concept attributed a value that originates in experiments, i.e. from some of our sensations. This shows how the structure of our explanations gets a quite different point of departure, because of the rejection of unnecessary assumptions.

Of course the intention of these treatises is not to place man at the centre of the world, but only to place the references to it at the top of the structure of our explanations in so far as this starts from the top. The matter is logical, or tautological: our situation in the world including our sensations is the starting point of our explanations.

Something similar as what applies to nuclear physics applies to theories of evolution: To speak about “our life as a coincidence” cannot haves meaning, as our life, in the shape of our experiences, thoughts, etc., is our point of departure in all physic relations, cf. the remarks concerning entities in nuclear physics above. We might imagine that we follow the chronological paths in the structure of our explanations, i.e. the paths that are in accordance with our arrangement of memories, and with theories about prehistoric evidences, etc. In that case, we can naturally not come across anything that is inconsistent with our very existence or something that makes it a coincidence. This is due to its being presupposed as a point of departure, the whole way down in our explanations. (Cf. the concept of explanation structure and top-down explanations, which are described in Treatise No 2.)

Thus, these thoughts have the same consequence in three different areas, namely as regards 1) what we call the structure of matter, 2) what we call the historical past, and 3) theories about the Big Bang. In all these respects, the above rejections of existence imply that our explanations get a different starting point than it has according to realism or common sense. In the hic-et-nunc philosophy, our explanations seem to obtain the same character of pure theoretic construction in these cases, especially when we look at details deeper than the microscopic level and further back in time than the geological past.

2.2 Our body.

It follows from the account above, that the concept of our sense organs is just a secondary and derived concept, for we do not have to assume more than what we have to realize, namely that we sense. The fact that we hear by means of our ears expresses just the fact that if we cover what we call our “ears”, or if they are damaged, then we hear worse. Furthermore, that the ear drum has its peculiar function to the hearing only means that its movements may be related in a certain way both to measurements of the oscillations of the air and to the sounds we hear, and so on as to the other parts of the ear. Something analogous applies to our other organs: we may likewise relate these to visual impressions and to other sense impressions. When we assert that we hear by means of the ear and the organs related to that, we only have to understand this in the following way: Between these organs (conceived as described above) and our ability to hear, a number of relations of the just outlined sort exist.[4]

There is of course no question of being sounds in itself, which we hear, somewhere out in the world or outside the ear, but not of being oscillations in the air in itself either, as something different from this. These oscillations belong to a theoretic model in which they as theoretic entities can be related scientifically to our sound impressions. In this way, only, they are something we sense. In this connection, it must be observed that though we talk about oscillations in the air, we only need to assert that these oscillations are something we measure. These measurements are our verification procedure for “oscillations in the air”.

Some phenomenalists will possibly say that our concept of a body is constituted by certain sense impressions. To this could be added: plus of our memories about that sort of sense impressions and actions that concern the first mentioned sense impressions, i.e. our relations to them. However, we could more precisely say that in our here-situation we possess a concept of a body in this way: We are able to conceive the body roughly like other physical objects, namely as a whole that we are able to describe and to clarify, but with the difference that more applies to the body than to other sorts of objects. On the one hand this whole possesses a number of attributes, viz. the sense impressions that can be related to this whole; on the other hand some of these impressions bear a relation to the conditions for our being able to have sense impressions, at all. This has above been exemplified concerning the ear and the hearing.

2.3 Time.

Certainly, in our here-situation we can arrange our memories, the now, and our expectations in a temporal arrangement, with past, present time, and future. However, because it can consistently be asserted that time is just a way of arranging our memories and fictions, it becomes one arrangement among others.

Some may advance the counterargument that it is a useful assumption to assume the literal reality of the past and future. However, useful assumptions are not necessarily true; they are just useful and we can talk about them as if they are true.[5]

2.3.1 The past.

We are situated in a pure here-situation where what we call “past” is related to:

1) Our memories.

2) Present marks (so-called evidences for past actions).

3) Fictions about the past consisting of fictive entities, qualities and events, which are to fill in the gaps between our memories.

We can talk about these elements and features and to draw conclusions about them as if they were present, and we may even see different fictions in our mind's eye. Based on so-called marks and evidences of this past, we can draw our conclusions about the fictive future features. Thereupon we may conclude the opposite way (towards the present) to the existence of not yet found marks, conclusions which we imagine to be able to verify later.

It must be noticed that the fact that our statements about the past thus do not have literal meaning, does not imply that we cannot feel these memories as experienced time. On the contrary, this intensity is simply an attribute of our memory impressions.

The present account raises a number of questions, for instance, concerning its ethical consequences. First, however we will look at a more general objection: “Do our memories possess any importance to our actions, if they are only memories?” I might possess memories (memory impressions) of the action of turning on a tap at the wash basin in the bathroom without possessing memories of turning it off. Then, in my here-situation, I may use my other memory impressions and knowledge of the regularities of nature to form a fiction in which I do not go into the bathroom and turn off the tap. We obviously act because of the very fiction. For this reason, my memories do possess significance for my actions here and now; so the past is not lesser important according to these ideas than according to the realist ideas.

Next, we can discuss the question whether any ethical consequences may be connected to our memories by means of a simple example. If I possess memories of having dropped a pack of coffee at the hall to a block of flats, why do I then have to feel committed to remove it and to clean the floor?

We may now follow two lines:

1) We may assert that to feel an obligation of this sort is simply a part of the world in which we live. Thus, the discussed feeling or attitude is just one of my impressions. This is a fact, which we have to attempt to clarify by working out what it is related to, and not by finding a cause of it in the traditional sense.

It must be remarked, this ethical question does not specially concern a problem, which this hic-et-nunc philosophy must solve in order to be accepted, but a problem to whose uncovering it has contributed. In a similar way, the fact that we live and act in harmony with the principle of induction, contrary to the fact that we cannot prove this principle, is only an uncovered problem, too. (Cf. [Hume 90], §§ 35-36) To assert in analogy with Hume’s solution that we simply act on the basis of our fictions for the reason that we are constituted in that way, or because we have that habit, is not a satisfying explanation either.

2) I know that the dropped coffee lays there, scattered all over the floor. This fact is related to my person: according to my future fictions, I will expect to see this again; or rather, I will form future fictions about it. Moreover, we have to distribute our actions, such as cleaning away dropped groceries, in a reasonable way, and it would lead to unreasonableness if other persons would have to “tidy up after me”. The difference between other persons and me is that that it is me who have these memory impressions and only me, according to my knowledge of the regularity of nature. Therefore, I have to act. At least, I am able to picture different unacceptable fictions in this connection.

Furthermore, we know the attitude which is expressed by the sentence “That is only past, let it be!” This sentence is even expressed by persons who have a traditional realist or common sense concept of time. This is not meant to disparage the problem, but only to show that the problem is not caused by my philosophy, but is a general problem, which may exist in the same form for the realist.

2.3.2 The future.

Just as the adherents of common sense imagine that present time follows past, they usually also imagines that present time is followed by a time called “future”. However, we do not have to assume that any future exists, comprehended or constructed as a continuation of our ordinary arrangement of our memories and our here-situation. We do not have any reasons to it either, for we have never experienced the future as future, and if we had, the experience would be memories now. Therefore, what we speak about, when we speak about the future, can only be an imagination of the existence of not-recollected, not-experienced experiences in such an imagined continuation. This resembles our memories and our present time, also as regards the way in which we have structured these. Thus, it is a cleared or thinned concept of the future that has been expressed by this construction.

Let us suppose that the future is in fact something coming (and that it thus has semantic meaning to assert this it), then we could not be sure that it actually will continue tomorrow. For instance, we are not able to conclude this by induction. (Cf. [Hume 90], §§ 24–26.) Therefore, also under this condition, it would be difficult to explain why we act, and why we do it without making a problem of it at all. Thus, our situation is not conclusively different as regards explanations, let alone easier, according to this realist idea than according to the minimal construction of the anti-introductionism.

However, we can also resume the question: Why do we act, if future is not something that comes? Among our reasons for acting is naturally that the action possesses a value in the here-situation, for instance when an author wants to write an article. This may have a value or purpose to the author (the occupation may have a clarifying effect on her/him). However, why send the manuscript, why raise from the chair at all? There seemingly is a problem here - for now, when “the future never comes but instead we only have to do with a fiction”, why not lean back, simply?

However, this is not a counterargument against the philosophical result that our talk about future does not have literal meaning, but is just an uncovered problem. We have to understand the world picture that is the result of this minimalist way of thinking, as it is. It is thus misleading to say, “Future never comes”, according to the discussion above, which was not about existence but has proved that the expression “the future” cannot have literal meaning. About this we can at most say that we exist in a hic-et-nunc situation and act because we enter into the spirit of our future fiction.

It has been argued that we cannot refer to any future, but only to our fictions about a future. In addition, it has been made good that even if the conception of a future did possess a meaning we would not be able to know that the imagined future would come, so this would not change the problem. Thus, from the very fact that we act it cannot follow that time must exist, not even if the lacking literal meaning of the concept- may seem paradoxical.

Perhaps we only need assume that we act because the fiction has a value in itself, as touched on above, and that our existence is constituted of the now with our sensations, thoughts, memory impressions, and fictions. The execution of the action is a necessary condition of the fiction. It forms part of and take active share in the fiction. The fiction contains relations between the real act and the imagined consequence in the fiction.

However, how will adherents of realism or common sense explain that we act at all? Probably they would say that we act because we want to be in a desirable situation, when the future inevitably comes. But if we thereby wish that the now disappears or find that the now is worthless, then this must hold for all nows, i.e. concerning all time, which does not seem to be true. However, if we do not act in this way, i.e. in order for the now to disappear, then we act for the sake of the now - more or less, as it is the case according to this hic-et-nunc minimalist philosophy. If we instead act both because the act has its own right in the now, then, for logical reasons, we also act for the sake of the now.

Again, a comparison of these ideas with common sense has that common sense is not as well-founded as it pretends to be, and that the former ideas are not as counter intuitive as it might seem.

2.3.3 The present and past time and the future of the past.

To recapitulate: We may consistently assert that only our here-situation exists. It has no sense to assert that what we call past situations are former present time, but only that these past situations are recollected or useful fictions. Their being recollected only means that they are memory impressions, i.e. that they are a certain sort of impressions that has got this misleading appellation. The fact that they can be called situations just means they have the same structure as the here-situation.

We cannot prove that our memory impression correspond to something we can call earlier present time, only that we have these memory impressions of the same kind of structure as the present time. We cannot adduce as a counterargument that we can remember a past time that has been present, for although our memory impressions have a strong character it is consistently possible to assert that they are only parts of the now. Only the present experience possesses complete present quality, e.g. the character of existing as colour experience, whereas the past is memory impression, e.g. colour memory impression.

The following argument for the reality of the past may be adduced: “You can do something now, in this now, which you must admit to be real, for instance to put a fresh point to your pencil, and in a moment you may be able to recollect that you pointed your pencil. In consequence, your recollection has to refer to something real.”[6]

However, this argument can be refuted. Certainly, we are able to perform an action now, such as the pointing of a pencil, but this does not imply any existence of a future memory of this action now. For an assertion about this would be both the assertion that the future exists now or will exist in the future and (with that) the assertion that the concept of future is valid. Before this assertion can enter as a premise in an argument it has to be made good, which is impossible for according to the argumentation above, the counter example can only be a future fiction about a future memory.

Another counterargument is, “You have just asserted some of your arguments in our present discussion. Is this adducing of arguments only recollections (yours and mine)?”

However, this argument is only appealing. Against that, it can only be said that it may seem difficult to understand, but it does not force us to assert that the past is former or deceased present time, or that something exists besides the here-situation with our sensations, memories, and thoughts.

Concerning our ideas of processes, the starting of which we here and now possess memories or other evidences of, according to common sense and realism, we can regard such processes as ongoing in a literal sense, i.e. in analogy with events hic-et-nunc. Based on memories of other cases of starting, on memories of observations following each of these, and on theories about all this, realists will think that they can make fictions about actual accidents, even though these actions take place at a not-observable place.

According to the anti-introductionism, we can only call such an imagined process “started”. This philosophy can, based on memories of other cases of starting, and the other conditions mentioned above, only accept fictions about not-observed accidents that take place now. These fictions are pure fictions, i.e. free fantasy if we can never confirm or disconfirm them according to any justified fiction about that. It is not necessary to introduce anything more than what is above mentioned as a part of reality.

Thus we can form fictions about a bather who has just jumped into a pipe that opens over a swimming pool a in a moment flopping out into the water with a splash. And we can make fictions about what will happens to a rocket that is send out into the space with a disc with information to possible finders. The latter fictions are predominantly completely arbitrary; however, the same applies to most of the details concerning the bather’s slide through the pipe.

2.4 Fictions and other persons’ consciousness.

It may be asserted against the advanced ideas that the thought that started, but unobserved processes do not exist at all in the same way as the directly observable processes, may seem contra intuitive, and that this is true the more so if persons’ feelings or sufferings are involved in the not-observable processes.

Thus it may be objected to this hic-et-nunc philosophy: “What is the position as regards persons who after an accident are lying helplessly hidden in the ruins of collapsed buildings - are they not feeling in a certain way, perhaps? Are they not suffering here and now, quite actually?” Someone may assert: “It is these specific persons themselves in their present situation we feel something for, not our imaginations about these persons in their situation. We presuppose that our imaginations about reality are true, that they correspond to reality, and it is this reality itself which we feel something for.”

Firstly, this way of presenting the case is simply not adequate: Above, arguments have been put forward for statements that are consistent; the very fact that they may seem contra intuitive does not make it inconsistent. Secondly, we are actually dealing with a misunderstanding of what we relate us to. We only relate to our imaginations, not to any situation in itself. Fore it is impossible to do this, as we have nothing to do with such an entity. Thirdly, the following may be advanced against the above objection. On the one hand, talking about anything that is in fact happening to these persons is simply does not possess any meaning, as we in no way can point out anything we can denote “that, which in fact happens to these persons”. Anything like that is simply not a part of our world, not a part of our hic-et-nunc situation. On the other hand, it is a fact that we feel something and that we form rough fictions and it is in relation to these, we have feelings. We cannot relate to facts, as we do not know any fact in this connection, only possibilities. Our fictions are not fictions about something that exists in someone or other form; they are simply fictions with the salient feature of being related to something of which we know.

We may compare the object of our feelings with what constitutes our relation to physical objects. It has above been described how our relation to physical objects works, without assuming realism. Analogous to that, we possess a relation to human happenings, which works. We base our fictions about happenings on our memory impressions of our own experiences of different sorts of incidents and on our having heard descriptions of other incident. We understand these descriptions because we have memories of happenings ourselves, and because our suppositions have been confirmed in a number of cases. Thus, we possess memories of our suppositions of other persons’ well-being as well as memories of later confirmations of these suppositions. This structure of memories forms a basis of our fictions, also.

We may try to make a comparison with my bathroom example, presuming that we know or experience, somehow, that other persons in some sense have a consciousness when we stand facing them. In our comparison, we can let this experience correspond to our sensation of an object. We see that water is flowing outside the bathroom door. Because we know the result of open taps we may form an impression of the being open of the tap. Then we form a fiction about the future based on this impression, and make a decision in the now.

In a quite similar way 1) we have seen houses with persons inside coming down and made ourselves fictions about the concerned persons and their physical conditions. Furthermore, 2) because we know about the relation between consciousness and physical conditions, we have made ourselves fictions about those persons’ sufferings. This point 2) is quite analogous to the tap example above.

What we take an interest in and feel for in such situations simply are fictions about human beings of whom we have memories and other ideas. We simply do not possess any other object to feel anything for in this connection. Even based on a realist understanding it is not possible to indicate such an object. The realist may protest and assert that what we feel for is the real situation of persons. However, as this concept is not clarified, since we can at most form fictions based on our knowledge to the regularity of nature, what is then the basis of our feelings? We need these fictions; but when we do not have a clear basis for our fictions themselves, we may nevertheless feel bad in a strange, unsafe way, as we do not know what to feel for.

It must be observed, that these considerations concerning other persons’ consciousness do not deal with the question whether the anti-introductionistic philosophy about this matter is correct, but the question whether its results are actually contra-intuitive.

The concept of other persons’ consciousness will be expounded further in Treatise No 2.

2.5 Fictions and time.

It may be objected that the ideas, here propounded, seem to make it difficult to understand what we actually experience, when we believe to experience the pass of time.

However, this does not reduce the value of having uncovered what we can at most put into the concept of time. Moreover, it does not imply that there is no room for happenings in our here-situation, but means that the structure of temporal facts must be differently interpreted than it must according to common sense. Thus, the now is not a point in a linear structure. This view of time is simply a consequence of my rejection of some superfluous assumptions.

This does not mean that we cannot give a concept about the duration of an incident, as this is e.g. possible by reference to our memories. Moreover, we can talk about its inner relational structure and the relations of which it forms a constituent part. We may be doing something in our here-situation, and we may enter into multifarious relations. Thus we formulate a thought by means of that linear structure by which it has to be expressed, though what it describes - and with that its semantic content - possesses the structure of a network.

Our fictions about a continued life after the now have a crucial importance to us. It can certainly appear evidently true that the future that occupies us is a real future or a future that is coming, but the literal truth of this idea has been queried above.

The fact that we form fictions about a continued life based on the regularities of our memories may explain why we let ourselves be carried away by literary and cinematic fictions. Our fictions about a future life plays such a great role to us, and the literary and cinematic fictions resemble them so much that we are affected by them as if they were just as real as our life. Our life fictions and the concrete objects and persons they refer to, are as such related to our here-situation, as these fictions are about a thought continuation of the now. This does not apply to other sort of fictions, for instance literary ones. Literary fictions possess a value by concerning the reader in his here-situation and by their way of doing that. However, even when a literary text does not possess this relevance, it may be difficult to relate oneself cool-minded to the text - and difficult to explain why this is so. These last remarks are only supposed to be an attempt to explain this effect; they are not a psychological and supplementary argument for this philosophy, but only passing remarks.

Literature.

[Berkeley 88] George Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge
Penguin Books (London 1988)

[Dummett 78] Michael Dummett: Truth and other Enigmas
Duckworth (London 1978)

[Fraassen 80] Bas C. van Fraassen: The Scientific Image
Oxford University Press (Oxford 1980)

[Hume 90] David Hume: Enquiries
Clarendon Press (Oxford 1990)

[1] Dummett’s view on realism and anti-realism is described and discussed in Treatise No 4.

[2] This contradicts what Dummett says about learning in “The Reality of the Past”, ([Dummett 78], p. 363). The subject is also discussed in the subsection “The past” in Treatise No 4.

[3] It must here be remarked that Bas van Fraassen says something similar in his “constructive empiricism” in The Scientific Image ([Fraassen 80], p. 12). This is discussed and criticized in Treatise No 4.

[4] Whether the anti-introductionism has a dualism problem at all is discussed in the section “The mind-body problem in anti-introductionistic elucidation” in Treatise No 6.

[5] Cf. Treatise No 5, the section “The concept of useful assumption in the realism debate”.

[6] Here, I owe to refer to Dummett’s discussion of the use of the concept of truth value-link as an argument for the reality of the past [Dummett 78], p. 362-3.

Philosophical debate

Sunday, December 2, 2012

Anti-introductionism. Treatise No 1.

An exposition of our cognitive situation.

Treatise No 1.