Summary.
This
treatise starts with reproductions of three contributions from my blog ([Arguments]).
This has the following reasons:
Treatise No 6 ended with an investigation of
whether there is an objective justification of ethics. This investigation appeared
to be indirect, as it was based on the necessity of an interest in finding a
solution, and as the interest in debating a question does not immediately seem
to have anything to do with the answer to it.
It
was asserted, however, that perhaps the answer was not quite far-fetched, and
this can be clarified here. For in the meanwhile, the writing of a summary of
this important investigation (for my blog) has uncovered a greater coherence
between interest and solution. Therefore, this coherence is cleared up. This
takes place in the first section, “An ethical basis”.
Treatise No 5 ended with the section “Semantic
critique of religious sequences of signs”. In the meantime, I have been more
explicitly acquainted with the concept of ignosticism,
which may seem to comprise this criticism of religious expressions. There is a decisive
difference, however. This is made clear in the section “Ignosticism and semantic
meaning”.
This
contribution referred to another contribution, which therefore is first reproduced.
This is done in the section “Presuppositions in religion and the realism
debate”, which among other things presents the two most basal presuppositions
that can be thought of. These are made in all statements. They are illustrated
with examples of erroneous presuppositions.
Like
the first three, the fourth subject belongs to practical philosophy. The discussion
of it is occasioned by some often-heard excuses of and accusations against
religions in connection to persons’ religiously related objectionable
behaviour: The religions are respectively called innocent or guilty. As
religious texts involve the extra problem that they are semantically meaningless,
it can be clarifying first to look at the isms since these have a semantic
content that can be discussed. Besides being semantically meaningful, the isms
can contain well-founded ideas. Contrary to this, there can be no religiously
justified ideas. It is concluded that people themselves chose to act, whether
this happens on the background of an ism or a religion. This subject is treated
in the section “Religion, isms and responsibility”.
1.
An ethical basis.
It
is decisively important to find out whether there is an objective basis of
ethics and politics, i.e. one or more objectively substantiated statements about
how it is most right to act.
The
question has already been answered in Treatise
No 6, which also advances some examples of the consequences for politics of
the answer. Some points are made clear in this section: It is a part of one’s
ethical deliberations to clarify the very question whether these have a basis.
The individual person too must clarify different circumstances in order to
evaluate his acts.
The
discussion referred to the point of view Alfred Ayer states in Language, Truth and Logic ([Ayer 74],
pp. 136-150), that the only thing we can argue for concerning moral is the
facts that sustain our moral conclusions given a particular moral attitude,
whereas we cannot argue for the very moral attitude concerned. ([Ayer 74], p.
146-7) As far as I can see, Ayer does not substantiate his own view, oddly
enough.
Alternatively,
as the next best answer to this question, we can imagine that a basis follows
from a particular assumption that it would be unreasonable not to accept.
However, luckily we do not have to leave it at that.
As
regards the necessary basis, we can make the following considerations.
1.1
The principle of argumentation.
With
due reference to Aristotle’s principle of
contradiction, we can talk of a “principle of argumentation”. The principle
is rather evident and sounds:
It
is necessary to be able to argue for what one asserts if it is to be a standpoint.
In
other words, one cannot both assert that a statement P is true, and that P has
not been justified. Of course, people can choose not to discuss their
standpoints. Those who have this attitude can just insistently assert, “I chose
to think whatever that suits me to think”; but in that case, we only are
dealing with an arbitrary, unfounded sentence. However, it is not a philosophical
problem if people are satisfied with that, but it is a serious sociological problem.
It
can certainly be argued against this standpoint, as far as it can be called a
standpoint at all, and not just an attitude, that it implies that any
standpoint can be just as good bad as any other, and that it leads to a
situation in which arbitrary standpoints are facing each other, unable to be
decided by argumentation. However, it is of no use to say this to the person
who advances it, as he does not accept argumentation. We can only convince the
holder of this view by getting him argue for his standpoint. For then, the
standpoint is not just a choice, but
a standpoint the holder thinks is right, and for which he wants to argue.
This
argument is an imitation of Aristotle’s argumentation for the principle of
contradiction: that we cannot argue against the person who denies it, as it
presupposes what is to be proved. We can only convince him by getting him
follow the principle. Cf. [Aristotle 1968] 1006a.
1.2
The derivation of a basis of ethics.
Instead,
if a person wants to discuss the question whether there is a basis of an ethic
and politics at all, he must admit that there is such a basis, and even which
basis it proves to be. I.e. not only can we conclude that the basis exists; we
can also point it out. This has the following reason:
If 1)
we want to discuss and search for an answer to this question whether there is a
basis of an ethic and politics, then 2) we must concentrate on it and seek to
clarify all the circumstances that can illuminate the matter. 3) This demands
favourable life conditions for those who will endeavour to make the necessary
investigations and considerations. With this, we have succeeded in finding the
basis of an ethics and a politics: the
consideration that everybody has good life conditions and a demand for it. This
basis is objectively true, because we could allow ourselves to presuppose the
condition (1). This basis has concrete implications concerning how the society
ought to be in order to fulfil this demand, and concerning how we ought to act.
It must be pointed out that this demand originates in (2) the necessity of
clarification and knowledge.
Of
course, each person’s individual situation and surroundings ought to be
involved in his evaluation of his acts. Thus, the individual must concentrate
on a number of different circumstances. For ethical questions must be decided
on the basis of an understanding of the case itself and of what this involves. Moreover,
this means that any kind of command ethics must be rejected.
As
touched on, it can be objected to the above argument that it is very
far-fetched to argue that there are objective arguments concerning how we ought
to act and to arrange society arguments, and that these arguments are based on
the conditions for the very discussion of whether there is an objective ethical
basis.
To
this, it can be answered that all kinds of investigations and clarifications certainly
demand good conditions of life. This applies for instance to the investigation
of the existential question of whether life has meaning (in the sense of purpose),
and whether this concept has a semantic meaning at all. This applies to
philosophy, linguistics, and all kinds of education, both to receive it and to
give it. However, the question is whether this argument is sufficient to point
out a basis of ethics. It would of course be fine if it were so, so it is not
to belittle this argument that the following must be considered. However, we
must be quite sure. For this reason, the two answers must be compared:
If
we presuppose that am existential question is to be answered, this certainly
involves that the question must be investigated and that this demands good life
conditions. However, there exists no necessary demand for an answer of the
question. Thus, the moral basis does not follow with necessity, but only as a
side issue of this precondition.
However,
if we presuppose that we have to answer the very question whether there is a
basis of ethics, then it is self-evidently a necessary demand that the question of the basis of an ethics must
be answered, just because it is put forward. Therefore, the above found moral
basis follows of necessity.
This
answer is neither farfetched nor technical as it is exactly a part of one’s
ethical considerations to consider whether the ethic is based on a necessary
basis, and thus whether one’s acts and chosen politics are based on a necessary
basis.
How
broad this basis is, i.e. which types of acts it has clear implications,
however, is not immediately clear.
It
must be observed that we cannot sell out of this basis, understood such that
reducing persons’ favourable life conditions can be justified with the argument
that they will benefit from this later in some future fiction. We live here and
now and thus need good life conditions here and now. All what we do must always
be related not only to the consideration of all persons good life conditions,
but also to the reason to this consideration, which consists in each individual’s
possibility for enlarging his horizon..
2. Presuppositions in religion and the realism
debate.
The well-known, teasing question, “Do
you still beat your wife?” presupposes the truth of at least two assumptions
(i.e. implies their truth for
different semantic reasons): that the respondent has a wife, and that he has
beaten her. If this is not the case, the respondent can answer neither in the
affirmative nor in the negative without admitting what is presupposed. Instead,
he may answer e.g., “In fact, I have never beaten my wife”.
This popular example comes under H.
P. Grice’s considerations about communication in the article “Logic and
conversation”. Grice’s main result is that the successful communication comprises
exactly what is necessary in order to communicate the message aimed at. It must
be observed that yet an essential example of presupposition can be added:
1)
Any statement presupposes one particular, overriding condition, viz. that the statement has semantic meaning,
especially that the individual words have word meaning.
The
reason is that nobody would just express the mere sounds, i.e. semantic
meaningless sign sequences. This must be the most important presupposition of
all kinds of presuppositions. Moreover, the following applies:
2) Any sentence presupposes that the interlocutor can accept the contained concepts.
The reason is here that this is the
condition of a clear understanding of the utterance. This must be the next most
important presupposition of all. Moreover, the following applies.
Any sentence presupposes that contained
concepts are thought-through, and that they are not up for discussion.
However, this is just another aspect
of point 2, and it can just as well be an overestimated view as a
presupposition. Corresponding presuppositions of course apply to questions, mutatis mutandis.
It must also be observed that when a
sentence can be declared semantically meaningless, it qualifies neither to be
disproved nor proved, neither empirically nor rationally. For it has no
semantic content.
Among the examples of sign sequences
that may have semantic meaning but which some do not want to accept for
specific reasons, can be the Danish term “starthjælp”[1] or metaphorical use of the term “arbiter of taste”. Their reason may be
that the former is used as a kind of new speech about reduced social benefits
and the latter about persons who have studied a field.
It must be observed that to explain
what something, i.e. some X or other, is, it is insufficient just to say “X is something that has these and these
qualities” or “X is that which is so
and so”, unless the defining relative clause refers to the concept that should
be the starting point of the definition. However, this would make the sentence
unnecessarily clumsy. (It would e.g. be clumsy to say, “A table is something that
is a piece of furniture that...”) Instead, we must use the schema “X is a Y
that has these and these qualities”. We could e.g. say “A table is a piece of
furniture that...” or “A table is a physical object that...” In other words, we
can only define something by means of already clarified concepts.
2.1
Religion.
An important example of this error is
the question “Do you believe in God?” which presupposes that it consists of
words, especially that the sign sequences “believe” and “God” are words.[2] The section “Semantic
critique of religious sequences of signs” in Treatise No 5 makes good that this is not the case at all, but that
these sign sequences only borrow an appearance of semantic meaning from usages
in which they in fact have semantic meaning and thus are words. This, we can
answer this question neither in the affirmative nor in the negative without presupposing
that the two mentioned sign sequences “believe” and “God” have semantic
meaning. Likewise, the concepts theist,
agnostic and atheist presuppose too much, if we for instance define a theist as
a person that asserts, “I believe in God”. Thus, we cannot either answer the
question “Are you an atheist?” without accepting the religious persons’ putative
concepts. Instead, we can only say that those who call themselves atheists have
not understood the religious persons’ error, and explain this the way it has
been done in the treatise referred to above.
From the arguments above in can be
concluded that when A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and
Logic advances a stringent rational proof against the existence of a putative
God, this is superfluous. ([Ayer 74], pp. 151-158) For there is neither something to prove nor disprove.
Certainly, also Ayer concludes that
the theists are not sufficiently critical. However, his reasons are that they
accept statements such as ‘There is no transcendent god’, which are
“nonsensical”, because they are metaphysical
and for that reason are not propositions. ([Ayer 74], p. 153) However,
it must be observed that when Ayer says that “the term ’God’” is a metaphysical
term ([Ayer 74], p.
152), he erroneously attributes some semantic meaning to
the sign sequence “God”, or at least he presupposes
that this sign sequence has a semantic meaning, for otherwise it cannot be a
term.
The
difference between the anti-introductionistic criticism and Ayer’s criticism is
that according to the former religious sentences are semantically senseless
while according to the latter they are just metaphysical, which according to Ayer
does not mean that they are semantically meaningless (cf. [Ayer 74], p. 55-56).
As mentioned, however, the semantically meaninglessness
of the religious sentences is due to their lack of word meaning.
2.2
The realism debate.
In his treatise Reality Lost and Found, Søren Harnow Klausen commits
an unfortunate, unfounded presupposition by advancing this statement:
“Since antirealism is the denial of
realism, the definition of this term becomes absolutely crucial”. ([Klausen 04]
p. 13)
The reason is that the premiss about
anti-realism presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the concepts that
enter into this definition, which does not have to be the case at all. It is
just as wrong to assert that anti-realism is the opposite of realism as it is
to assert that atheism is the opposite of theism – for similar reasons. Thus,
there are far more that have to be thought-through than what Søren Harnow Klausen
presupposes.
This also applies to what follows. S.
H. Klausen presents this definition of realism:
“Realism about the external world is
the view that the world exists and has its fundamental properties independently of the
way it is experienced, conceived, spoken or written about or coped with by
conscious beings.” ([Klausen 04] p. 13-14)
However, S. H. Klausen does not
thematize what it means to say that the world exists. Instead, S. H. Klausen
copies what he wants to negate into his definition of anti-realism, which is
exactly what one cannot do if one wants to do full justice to the realism
debate:
“Anti-realism is any denial of – or refusal to subscribe to - the view that the world
exits...” with the same additions as referred above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)
However, the anti-realist does not at
all need to deny that the world exists, or that the attributes of the world depend
of how it is experienced. For of course an anti-realist will not deny the
statement, “the world exists” but just have a different interpretation of the
statement than the realist has, as far as the latter has an interpretation.
Thus, the anti-realist may think that it is absurd to ask whether “the world
exists”, and that the realism debate is about the semantic meaning of this statement,
including what it means that things exist and have the qualities they have.
It is thus expressive of a simplified
idea of the substance of the realism debate if the expression “the denial” is
supposed to denote the directly contrary viewpoint. For then it presupposes
that the anti-realist can accept the realist’s view of the problem as being
about existence versus not-existence. If, however, the expression is just to
denote some alternative view among other, it becomes too loose and not a
definition of anti-realism.
For safety’s sake, S. H. Klausen makes
clear his simplified with of the problem with this statement:
“Realism is of course the belief
in the existence of reality”. ([Klausen 04] p. 14, my underlining.)
However, as already made clear, the
realism debate does not deal with existence
versus not-existence, but with the semantic meaning of our existence statements;
and it does not at all deal with any form of belief or supposition, but with
arguments. This naturally turns the attention to the fact that S. H. Klausen’s
lacking accept of this is already suggested by the title of S. H. Klausen’s
book, Reality Lost and Found. This
title suggests that reality does not exist according to the one part of the realism
debate, but exist according to the other part, Klausen himself, who has
realized “the existence of reality”.
S. H. Klausen defines reality and the
world in this remarkable way:
‘And reality is simply “the world” as
defined above”: that which exists
independently of its being experienced...’ with the most of the additions
above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)
What is remarkable in this quotation
is its use of the following concept:
“that
which exists independently of its being experienced...”.
This definition reminds incredibly
much of past definitions of some entity X called “God”, e.g. “that which is the
greatest”. Both definitions presuppose that it has been clarified what kind of
“that” we are dealing with.
Firstly, the definition presupposes
that it has sense to discuss the subject in this way, which as mentioned is
exactly what the realism is about and which some anti-realists want to argue
against. Secondly, the definition presupposes that the opponent can accept it. However,
as it has already been concluded, definitions demand clarified concepts.
Søren Harnow Klausen’s erroneous
approach has also been touched on in the section “The semantic approach the
realism debate” in Treatise No 4.
3. Ignosticism and semantic meaning.
The article “Presuppositions in
religion and the realism debate” inter alia pointed out the error of defining
atheism as the opposite of theism.
Certainly, this broader definition of atheism can be suggested: “Being an
atheist is the same as not being a
theist”. (Cf. the homepage [Skepticism], my translation.) According to this
homepage, atheism is the absence of belief in gods. However, this definition
demands some goodwill, as not all who do not
want to call themselves atheists can accept it. They have good reasons not to
do this, as it is possible to argue that religious sentences are semantically
senseless, as e.g. the sign sequences “god” and “belief” lack word meaning when
used in religious contexts, and as the definition of theism is based on these
sign sequences. Cf. the section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of
signs” in Treatise No 5, in which it
is explained why religious sentences lack word meaning and therefore are
semantically senseless. Persons that have understood this can be called neither
theists nor atheists. For as mentioned, it is possible neither to deny nor to
affirm a semantically senseless sentence, but only to assert and make good that
it is in fact semantically senseless. Some may call this view agnosticism, but as mentioned, this term
does not have semantic meaning either.
Finally, it must be observed that the
statement that a particular sentence is semantically senseless is stronger than
the statements that the sentence is true or that that it is false; the reason
is that it does not even qualify itself to be evaluated as true or false.
3.1
Ignosticism.
The view ignosticism or igtheism
is apparently in agreement with these considerations; however, but it is too
unclear as it also suggests a certain acceptance of the religious sign sequences.
According to www.wiktionary.org, the etymology of the
word “ignosticism” is:
“ig- (from ignorant)
+ gnostic
+ -ism. Coined by Rabbi Sherwin Wine.” ([Etymology])
Here I will only consider the
definition of ignosticism as it is worded in the British version of Wikipedia,
and some of the resuming remarks in the article.
Wikipedia states two definitions of
ignosticism. According to the first, ignosticism is:
“The view that a coherent definition
of God must be presented
before the question of the existence of God can be meaningfully discussed.” ([Ignosticism])
As far as it goes, this corresponds
to what has been put forward in the above-mentioned section “Semantic critique
of religious sequences of signs”, but only after a necessary correction. For in
order not to be semantically erroneous by presupposing too much, it ought to be
worded in this way:
“The view that a coherent definition
of the term “God” must be presented before the statement
“God exists” can be meaningfully discussed.” ([Ignosticism], my underlinings
of the corrections.)
In the just referred section from Treatise no 5, however, it has also been
argued that in fact such a semantic
meaning cannot be established, as a
number of possibilities of this were gone through and criticized.
The referred lexicon article also
states:
‘A simplified maxim on the subject
states “An atheist would say, ‘I don't believe God exists’;’ an agnostic would
say, ‘I don't know whether or not God exists’; and an ignostic would say, ‘I
don't know what you mean when you say, “God exists”’.”’ ([Ignosticism])
To this, it must be remarked that it
is misleading to rank the latter view with atheism and agnosticism. These two
views on religions can certainly be ranked each other and to agnosticism, as
all three presuppose that the above-mentioned sentences, which their adherents
would put forward, have a semantic meaning and do not just borrow an appearance
of semantic meaning from real words. However, in its best wording, ignosticism
is just a result of the quite
elementary truth that all sentences must have a clarified meaning in order to
be discussed.
Above all, however, the quotation
simply turns the case upside down. The persons that can argue for the semantic
senselessness of the religions are not ignorant. First, they can exactly ague
for their view. Second, it is not them but the religious persons that must be
able to explain their own putative concepts, before they can attribute a
semantic meaning to them. As long as the religious persons cannot do this, they
are ignorant concerning what diffuse ideas they have themselves. In the above-mentioned
section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs”, this has been gone
through and justified in a number of respects, and with increasing goodwill. We
are here dealing with the same kind of misuse of the word “ignorant”, as when a
person is called ignorant if he does not know where his neighbour keeps his toolbox.
According to the second definition of
the lexicon article, ignosticism is synonymous to theological noncognitivism.
3.2
Theological noncognitivism.
This ism is defined in this way:
’Theological
noncognitivism is the argument that religious
language, and specifically words like God, are not cognitively meaningful. It is sometimes considered to be
synonymous with ignosticism. ([Theological noncognitivism])
However, the former statement is too
week, as the concept of cognitive meaningfulness only demands that what is
discussed has to be decidable, either analytically or empirically. However, as
religious sentences are not semantically
meaningful, they do not even qualify to be objects of an analytical or
empirical examination.
However, the lexicon article also asserts
the following, which bears a greater likeness to ignosticism:
“As with ignosticism,
the consistent theological noncognitivist awaits
a coherent definition of the word God (or of any other metaphysical utterance
purported to be discussable) before being able to engage in arguments for or
against God's existence.” ([Theological
noncognitivism], my use of bold types.)
It is true that we cannot express
ourselves about sentences that use unclarified concepts and therefore is not statements.
However, it is misleading to call the knowledge of this fact being waiting. We are just dealing with the elementary demand that any
sentence must have a clarified meaning for it to be a statement we can take a
position on.
Moreover, the quoted passage is
semantically senseless itself, as it contains the unclarified sign sequence
“God’s existence”, and it does not help to change this to “a putative God’s existence”.
The wording intriguingly suggests that it is granted that this sign sequence
can be attributed a meaning we just wait for. The quotation contains the same
error as the sentence “Before it can be decided whether Kryxir exists it must
be decided what ‘Kryxir’ denotes”. This sentence suggests that, it is granted that
“Kryxir” denotes something we have just not clarified yet. Certainly, we can
refer to sign sequences whose meaning we do not know, but we do not use them as
words. Instead, we can say, 'Some people assert that there is something they
call “Kryxir”. Before we can address this, they must explain what they talk
about’.
Both those who assert “Kryxir exists”
and those that assert, “God exists” may simply be expected to have an
explanation ready, i.e. to know what they say themselves. The ability of
pointing out the fact that the religious persons are not able to do this is naturally
just a knowledge that does not need a name. However, it deserves to be
discussed for the sake of peace.
4.
Religion, isms and responsibility.
This
section looks at the following two problems:
R1: Occasionally, criticism of a person’s
religiously conditioned behaviour is countered with the argument R1.1: that this criticism does not
concern the religion of the person
in question, but solely the person
in question himself. R1.2: This suggests
that in some way religions exist in themselves or are independent entities that
cannot be touched by such a criticism.
R2: Conversely, sometimes a person’s bad
behaviour is explained with the allegation that the person in question is an adherent
of an especially criticisable religion.
Therefore,
it is relevant to examine these two views, including whether by any means way
it makes any sense to talk about an entity that can be called “a religion in
itself”.
Strictly
speaking, this rather practical subject is slightly outside the field of these philosophical
treatises, however, parts of the discussion refer to subjects already treated.
Concerning
the examination of in what a religion in itself should consist, religions involve
the special problem that the religious sentences are semantically meaningless
sign sequences. (Cf. the section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of
signs” in Treatise No 5.) However, isms do not necessarily contain
semantically meaningless sign sequences. By way of example, socialist ideas can be described in a
semantically meaningful way. For this reason, it may be useful to clarify the
corresponding problems concerning isms first.
4.1
Isms and responsibility.
The
question of existence of isms in themselves falls within the question of
concepts in themselves. This question can immediately be compared to what has
been advanced concerning detecting a world in itself in the subsection “A
fundamental critique of the approach” in the subsection “The problem of the
external world” in Treatise No 5.
Here, the statement “an external world exists” was compared to the statement
“There is water on the moon”, which we can immediately understand, as we know what
it means that there is water on the moon. For we know what we have to search
for to find the water, and when we have found it. Moreover, we know something
about how we have to search for it.
Thus, we know the verification conditions or assertability conditions of the
statement, i.e. its meaning.
If
the statement “There are isms in themselves” are to be justified, this
justification must similarly involve answers to the following questions: What
does it mean that there is an ism in itself? What do we have to search for to
find an ism in itself? When have we found or detected an ism in itself? What
shall we do to find an ism in itself? Of course, this involves neither finding
anything physical nor finding a description, but what it otherwise should involve
is exceedingly unclear. Those who think that there are isms in themselves must
be able to explain this.
By
analogy with the conclusion in the referred subsection, we can moreover infer
that we can express the same thing independently of, or without referring to,
that indeterminable extra that may lie in the idea of “an ism in itself”. Therefore,
this idea cannot be about anything. The same applies to not-expressed ideas.
The
reason is that if a person draws up a theory or ism about how society is to be
organized and why, this is the only thing that is present to us:
We
must be able to explain and justify any idea we present, whether it has
appeared to us in a flash, or is something we have read. The idea only exists as
an idea by virtue of the presented explanations and justifications. Without
these, it at most consists in arbitrary statements.
So
much the less does it have any sense to assert that it has always existed.
Overall, it is an uninteresting assertion that this or any other ism has always
consisted in something in itself, i.e. as something else besides the now expressed
ism.
However,
these results only say something about what an ism cannot be. We still need to clarify what an ism is in fact.
Therefore, we have to examine what kind of entity an ism can at most be said to
be. The result proves to be a semantically meaningful concept of isms, which
involves the concept of justification.
The
question is whether e.g. socialism consists in a text, specific ideas,
behaviour, or possibly something else. If socialism consists in a text,
however, the text in question is only interesting if it can be understood as
interpreted sentences, for otherwise we are only dealing with signs. Thus, we
must regard socialism as consisting of ideas sought to be expressed, or which
can be deduced from a text. If we by socialism
understand an activity based on socialist ideas the adherents seek to follow or
propagate, the word “socialism” is just a short-form of the expression “the
socialist activity”. This does naturally not touch what is essential to this
discussion, as it deals with ideas as such.
In
all cases, as a political ideology the socialist ideas must consist in a number
of statements about how the world ought to be. We can compare these expressed
socialist ideas with how the world actually is and examine how far it is from
the ideals in question. With this, the description of them has a clear semantic
meaning. Therefore, socialism consists in these expressed ideas, just as any
other political ism consists in expressed ideas that can be compared to how the
world is.
Hereafter
we can look at the responsibility for acts carried out with reference to an
ism. The question is whether the responsibility can be attributed to the ism. We
must of course distinguish between the ethical quality of the ism and the personal
responsibility. Moreover, the chain of cause and effect has to be involved.
Irrespective
of which specific ism we are dealing with, there might be a person that calls
himself an adherent of it, and who acts badly in the name of the ism in
question. If this ism does not recommend acts of the committed kind, the act
does of course not fall back on the ism in question. In other cases, it may inter
in a chain of cause and effect.
If
a person on the background of the recommendations of an ism chooses to carry
out a certain act, this decision is based on his accept of the ideas of the ism.
This accept may be due to there being argued for them in the text in such a way
that they can convince him, because he can be influenced by exactly these accidental
causes or by the fact that the ideas and arguments are valid, and that he can
understand this. Other elements of the chain or complex of cause of effects may
be that the person in question already has some similar ideas in a vague
version, or that the content of the text or rather his understanding of it
makes him feel important.
Though
an ism can thus be part of a chain of cause and effect, the person that acts because
of the ism chooses his act himself:
The
person who adheres to an ism chooses this himself. If he acts because of an
ism, he himself has the responsibility for this, for he does not have to accept
the ideas of any ism, and he does not have to act because of any ism. It is not
a question of necessity but of a choice.
Therefore,
we cannot attribute the very cause of persons’ acts to an ism.
Whether
the individual person adheres to an ism because of its content, such as this
meaningfully can be described, or for other reasons, such as pressure, or just
because he let himself be influenced by his surroundings, the following demand must
be made:
Under
all circumstances, it is reasonable to expect or demand that that the person
who accepts an ism can justify his acceptance.
Thus,
the acting person also has the responsibility for an act he relates to
an ism, whereas it is a category error to attribute it to the very ism. For
other persons will perhaps just immediately realize that the text is wrong,
shake their head at it and argue against it. Moreover, it can be advanced that
we can certainly argue against an ism, but since we cannot blame it for
anything the very ism and its content are only part of the chain of cause of effect that leads to the act.
We
can now look at a variant of the problem that opened this section, as we let it
be about isms instead of religion. It may sound like this:
I1: Occasionally, criticism of the behaviour that
a person relates to an ism is countered with the allegation I1.1: that this criticism does not
concern the ism in question, but solely the person in question. I1.2: By this, it is suggested that in
some way isms exist in themselves or are independent entities that cannot be
touched by such a criticism.
I2: Conversely, sometimes a person’s bad
behaviour is explained with the allegation that the person in question is an adherent
of an especially objectionable ism.
The
discussion above leads to the following conclusions concerning this variant:
Re
I1.1: It is in fact the individual adherent
of an ism who is responsible for his behaviour, even if this is related to the
ism, for the single person chooses himself whether he will follow the ism in
question.
Re
I1.2: Isms do not exist in themselves.
However, there are isms that can be explained and justified, which also means
that they are ethical acceptable, for otherwise they would not be (correctly)
justified.
Re
I2: There are of course also isms
that can be criticized for calling for objectionable acts. Thus, there exist
both well-founded and unjustified isms. The former are ethically defensible,
while some of the latter may contain erroneous and unethical ideas. However,
the individual person has the responsibility for following these calls, for he
does not have to follow the bad recommendations of the ism.
4.2
Religions and responsibility.
Hereafter
we can return to the discussion of religion and responsibility that introduced
this section:
As
mentioned in the section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs” in
Treatise No 5, it has been made good
that religious texts in their basis consist of semantic meaningless sequences
that just loan an appearance of semantic meaning from sign sequences that in
fact have semantic meaning and thus are words. What happens is that the
religions reuse some words without using the meaning that the words in
questions have in their original, not-religious
use, but just use them in a vague way, as if they had a meaning that in some way
or other is relates to the original meaning or to some of the original meanings. This applies to sign sequences as “belief”
and “salvation”. In the subsection “Word meaning versus lacking reference” in Treatise No 6, it has be clarified how
this is possible.
Certainly,
a religious text can contain sentences that by themselves are semantically
meaningful, e.g. orders to perform certain acts; i.e. that they are real
statements that express ideas. However, none of these sentences can be
justified on the basis of the semantic meaningless statements that enter into other
parts of the religion. In fact, nothing can be asserted that does not have to
be justified by reference to the case itself. Thus, ethical statements can only be justified by reference to the case
itself:
If
any ethical statements should true, this truth cannot be due to any religion.
For it is not possible to put forward any reasonable religious statement that
cannot be justified by reference to the case itself, as that which does not
concern the case cannot be used as a premise. The semantic meaningless
sentences of the religions especially cannot concern the case because of their
lacking semantic meaning. They cannot be used as premises of any statement at
all.
The
religious orders to perform certain acts just make up attached ethical
statements, e.g. of the form “You ought to perform / omit the act A”. As
already justified, the semantic senseless sentences of the religion cannot be
used as a premise to ethical statements. Besides, attempting this would just
lead to semantic meaningless statements of the form: “The God X asserts that we
have to perform / omit the act A”. The attached ethical statements cannot
themselves contain justifications, for in that case they would have to refer to
the case itself, and therefore cannot have anything to do with religion.
Nevertheless,
it must be observed that the individual religious person himself puts something
uncertain and diffuse into the semantic meaningless sentences of the religion,
which according to him for some reason can be related to the in fact meaningful
concepts in which the religious ideas originate.
We
can now look at the problems concerning responsibility and religion that
introduced this section:
Re
R1.1: It is in fact the individual adherent of a religion who himself is
responsible for his behaviour, even if the person in question is motivated by
his religion, for the single person chooses himself whether he will follow the
religion in question. Thus, for logical reasons, the critique of such acts does
not concern the religion.
Re
R1.2: It has appeared that there are
no religions in themselves. Religions do not even have a religious content that
can be explained and justifies. Overall, it must be concluded that there is no
religion based on which it can be argued what are the good acts and what is the
good life. The reason to this is that religions do not contain valid religious arguments
for or against any acts, but only semantically meaningless sentences and
attached ethical statements.
Re
R2: Besides its semantically
meaningless sentences, a religion can also contain orders to perform certain acts.
For the corresponding reasons as above, of course it is also true that it
cannot contain valid arguments for these.
Generally,
it must be observed that if an ethic allegation can be defended or criticized,
this cannot be due to any religion, for religions do not contain usable religious
premises. A religion may contain true ethic allegations, but these must be justified
by reference to the case itself. Thus, a person that acts on demands does not
act on the basis of the case itself.
4.3
Conclusion.
It
can be concluded that isms can be discussed, criticized and possibly accepted,
as they have a semantic content. Therefore, in some cases there can be good
grounds for acting in compliance with of an ism, i.e. not because of the ism, but because of an understanding of the case
itself. Contrary to this, the following applies to religions:
Religious
sentences only have an appearance of semantic meaning and are thus unfounded. Therefore,
religion contains no good reasons to particular acts, and therefore there is no
reason to regard religion as superior to anything in any way.
Concerning
the comparison of religions that enters in the discussed problem, it can be
concluded that there are no reasons for any religion being more preferable to
any other religion. Some persons may nevertheless maintain that the religion X
may contain worse demands and statements than the religion Y. This is possible;
however, it has just been made good that religious statements about the world
are completely unjustified. Therefore, these demands and statements are
accidental additions. It is incumbent on the individual to be so critical that
he can consider this.
It
must further be observed that it is an accident that there are the religions
that exist. It is an accident that the religions are the way they are. It is an
accident that the religions are geographically spread as they are spread. It is
accidentally that the adherents of the different religions behave as they do. These
circumstances are accidental simply because they might conceivably have been different.[3] It is
impossible to justify a complete determinism that can contradict this.
To this,
some will object that one of these accidental states could be better the other
states. However, such a comparison presupposes that it can be justified, which
must be done on the basis on the case itself, i.e. rationally. Otherwise, it
has no sense to characterise religions in this way. However, the religious
person will hardly accept that his religion should be rationally based.
Litterature:
[Aristoteles 68] Aristoteles:
The Metaphysics,
English translation by High Tredennick,
Harvard Univ. Press, William Heinemann Ltd. (Great Britain 1968).
English translation by High Tredennick,
Harvard Univ. Press, William Heinemann Ltd. (Great Britain 1968).
[Ayer 74] A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books
Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).
[Grice 94] H. P. Grice: “Logic
and Conversation”, i Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Robert M. Harnish (ed.), (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994).
[Salmon 70] Wesley C. Salmon, ed.: Zeno’s Paradoxes
Bobbs-Merrill (Indianapolis & New York, 1970).
Bobbs-Merrill (Indianapolis & New York, 1970).
[1] Until
2012, in spite of its name (“start help”), this term denoted a low social
benefit.
[2] As this precondition
is not fulfilled, this sign sequence is only called a question in order to not
to make the text too prolix.
[3] This originates from the article,
“The contingency of religions” in my blog [Arguments].
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