Preface B. An addition.
Contents.
Clarifications.
Of course, it is not expedient that an author constantly corrects his
published treatises, each time he finds an inaccuracy or a minor error. However,
there are two remarks that the author pf these treatises has considered faulty
or misleading for quite a long time.
Treatise No 5 the section “The concept of useful assumption in the realism debate”
Wrong comment
on the use of the expression “good assumption”.
The section “The concept of useful assumption in the realism debate” in Treatise No 5 states that the concept of
useful assumption in the realism debate has previously been treated in the
section “A critique of realism as a good explanation” in Treatise No 4 ‘though in that section the concept was not referred
to by means of the term “useful assumption” but the term “good explanation”.
It must however be made clear that also
the term “good assumption” was used in that section.
Treatise No 7 “Presuppositions in religion and the realism debate”.
Misleading
mention of H. P. Grices discussion of presuppositions.
The section “Presuppositions in religion and the realism debate” in Treatise No 7 states that concept of presupposition
‘example comes under H. P.
Grice’s considerations about communication in the article “Logic and conversation”’.
Then it is explained that “Grice’s
main result is that the successful communication comprises exactly what is necessary
in order to communicate the message aimed at”.
It is true enough that the concept
of presupposing s touched by these considerations, but in fact Grice does not discuss
the concept of presupposition in the mentioned article.[1]
A more elaborate explanation
can be made by the following rewrite of the introduction to this section.
Presuppositions in religion and the
realism debate.
The well-known, teasing question, “Do you
still beat your wife?” presupposes the truth of at least two assumptions (i.e. implies their truth for different
semantic reasons): that the respondent has a wife, and that he has beaten her.
If this is not the case, the respondent can answer neither in the affirmative
nor in the negative without admitting what is presupposed. Instead, he may
answer e.g., “In fact, I have never beaten my wife”.
It must be
remarked that it is not erroneous to suppose the person questioned has beaten
his wife, as this in fact can be the case.
The
presupposition was here expressed by the adverb “still”. However, there is an
especially basal example of presupposition, which we shall look at now:
1) Any statement presupposes that
the statement has semantic meaning, especially that the single words have
word meaning.
The reason is
that nobody wants to express the mere sounds, i.e. semantically meaningless
sign sequences. This must be the most important presupposition of all kinds of
presuppositions.
To this, the
person questioned may answer: “Your question is semantically meaningless”.
Here, the
presupposition is contained in the very putting forward of the uttered signs.
Moreover, the following applies:
2) Any sentence
presupposes that the interlocutor can accept the contained concepts.
The reason is
here that this is the condition of a clear understanding of the utterance. This
must be the next most important presupposition of all.
To this, the
person questioned may answer: “I do not like your condescending designations”.
Exactly this
question of presupposition of semantic meaning can be seen in the light of the
basic result of H.P. Grice’s conclusions in his article “Logic and
conversation”. Grice’s main result is that the successful communication
comprises exactly what is necessary
to communicate the message aimed at.
When we
expresses a statement, we must – in agreement with this result – be interested
in expressing ourselves as clearly as possible, just as we will expect that the
speaker will be interested in expressing himself as clearly as possible.
We must
therefore be interested in that what we say has semantic meaning, most of all;
just as we will expect that the person we listen to, will make sure that his
utterances have semantic meaning. In fact, it would not have any purpose to
assert anything, or use any express something that has no semantic meaning.
However, we ma
commit the erroneous assumption that what we say has sematic meaning, though it
does not have it.
Concerning word
meaning, it is worth observing that to explain what something, i.e. some X or
other, is, it is insufficient just to say “X is something that has these and these qualities” or “X is that which is so and so”, unless the
defining relative clause refers to the concept that should be the starting
point of the definition. However, this would make the sentence unnecessarily
clumsy. (It would e.g. be clumsy to say, “A table is something that is a piece
of furniture that...”) Instead, we must use the schema “X is a Y that has these
and these qualities”. We could e.g. say “A table is a piece of furniture
that...” or “A table is a physical object that...”
In other words,
we can only define something by means of already clarified concepts.
The semantic
error discussed here is committed in religious sentences.
Treatise No 8.
1.1 A description of the paradox.
In the popularized version of one of Zeno’s
paradoxes, Achilles and the tortoise, the fast running Achilles has to catch up
with a tortoise that has a lead.
According to our common sense view of the run,
we will assert (1) that we know that Achilles will catch up with the tortoise.
However, according to the implicit reasoning in (2) Zeno’s account of the run,
Achilles will never catch up the tortoise.
Thus, the paradox consists of two conflicting
parts: 1) our common sense view of the race, which is based on memory
impressions of finished processes, and 2) Zeno’s account of it. Of course, Zeno
has a point with the paradox: It concerns our conception of time.
Re 1: Let us assume that Achilles runs G times
as fast as the tortoise, and that the leap is F units of length. According to
principles that are in accordance to our experience, it can be figured out that
that Achilles has cached up with the tortoise when he has run the distance F
G/(G - 1). This represents the common sense view of the run.
Re 2: Zeno’s reasoning can be recounted in this
way: When Achilles has run F units of length the tortoise has run F/G. When
Achilles has cached up with this lead, the tortoise has run F/G2.
When Achilles has run F/G2, the tortoise has run F/G3.
Etc. After each of these parts of the run, the tortoise still has a lead (that
certainly gets smaller and smaller, but never zero).
Litteratur.
[Berkeley
88] George Berkeley: Principles
of Human Knowledge
Penguin Books (London 1988)
Penguin Books (London 1988)
[Cole
81] Peter Cole, ed: Radical
Pragmatics
Academic Press (London 1981).
Academic Press (London 1981).
[Dummett
78] Michael Dummett: Truth and
other Enigmas
Duckworth (London 1978)
Duckworth (London 1978)
[Fraassen
80] Bas C. van Fraassen: The
Scientific Image
Oxford University Press (Oxford 1980)
Oxford University Press (Oxford 1980)
[Grice
94] H. P. Grice: “Logic and Conversation”, i Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Robert M. Harnish
(ed.), (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994).
[Kuhn 70] Thomas S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition, Enlarged
The University of Chicago Press
(Chicago 1970).
The University of Chicago Press
(Chicago 1970).
[1] Contrary to this,
HP Grice involves his conversation maxims in the article “Presupposition and
Conversational Implicature”. ([Cole 81])
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